JPRS-UMA-86-049

2 SEPTEMBER 1986

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

19990319 085

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MAJ GEN MAKAROV ON WESTERN THREAT, STRENGTH OF SOVIET FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Apr 86 pp 79-84

[Article by Maj Gen V.Makarov; contribution to political lessons in the topic "The 27th CPSU Congress on Raising the Country's Defense Capabilities and the Combat Readiness of the Army and Navy, and Tightening Military Discipline": "The USSR Armed Forces--The Guard of Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] Lessons in this topic have the purpose of helping soldiers understand more deeply the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress concerned with raising the country's defense capabilities and the fighting power of the armed forces, and with the need for all-out tightening of military discipline, and for organization and order in the subunits, units and ships. During the lessons it is important to explain the details of the principles and conclusions stated in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress and in the new edition of the CPSU Program concerned with the complexity and conflicts of the modern international situation, and the tasks of the personnel implied by party requirements: They must always be prepared to cut off the intrigues of imperialism against the USSR and its allies, and to destroy any aggressor.

Six hours are devoted to this topic. Allocating 2 hours for narration, 2 hours for independent study and 2 hours for a discussion is recommended.

The following issues should be examined in the narration: 1. The 27th CPSU Congress and the New Edition of the Party Program on the Main Trends and Conflicts in the Modern World and on Growth of Imperialism's Aggressiveness.

2. The Concern of the Party and the Soviet People for Raising the Country's Defense Capabilities and the Fighting Power of the Armed Forces. 3. Tightening Military Discipline--The Duty of Every Serviceman.

It should be noted in a brief introduction that all of the life and activity of the Soviet people and their armed forces are now proceeding under the inspiring influence of a remarkable event in the life of the party and country—the 27th CPSU Congress. Implementation of the grandiose constructive plans of the party will not only make it possible for the Soviet people to take a new major step forward toward communism, but it will also raise the country's defense capabilities even further.

"Considering the complex international situation," noted Comrade M. S. Gorbachev in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress, "and the growing aggressiveness of reactionary imperialist circles, the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo are devoting unweakening attention to the country's defense capabilities, to the fighting power of the USSR Armed Forces and to tightening military discipline." High requirements were formulated toward army and navy personnel in the new edition of the CPSU Program. The armed forces, this highly important document stresses, must display high vigilance, and they must always be ready to cut off the intrigues of imperialism against the USSR and its allies, and to destroy any aggressor.

1. The 27th CPSU Congress and the New Edition of the Party Program on the Main Trends and Conflicts in the Modern World and on Growth of Imperialism's Aggressiveness

The 27th CPSU Congress provided a deep Marxist-Leninist analysis of the present international situation and of the trends of world development. It is noted in the CPSU Central Committee's Political Report to the Congress and in other documents that formation of the world socialist system and formation and consolidation of the socialist fraternity have led to fundamental change in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of peoples struggling for social progress, democracy, national liberty and peace.

Progress is validly identified in our times with socialism. World socialism is a powerful international formation. It relies on a highly developed economy, a solid scientific base and a dependable military-political potential. It represents over a third of mankind and dozens of countries and peoples traveling on the path toward comprehensive development of the intellectual and moral resources of man and society.

It is a demonstration of the humanitarianism of our entire way of life. Thus it is raising an increasingly stronger barrier to the ideology and policies of war and militarism, to reaction and violence, and to all forms of misanthropy, and it is actively promoting social progress. It has transformed into a mighty moral and material force, and it has shown what sort of possibilities are opening up before modern civilization.

Anticolonial revolutions, national liberation movements, international communist and workers movements, and mass democratic movements, including antiwar and antinuclear movements, are becoming extremely more active allies of socialism in its dominant influence upon the course of world progress.

But the world of capital, which is still strong and dangerous, is rendering opposition to forward-looking socialism, to the movement of national liberation and to developing countries that have selected the progressive path of development. Under the influence and on the background of the scientific-technical revolution, modern capitalism is causing the conflict between the enormously larger productive forces and social relations based on private

ownership to be even more acute. The overall crisis of capitalism is growing deeper. It is responsible for the creation, persistence and aggravation of all of the basic problems of modern times.

In an attempt to adapt to the altered situation, it is constantly maneuvering, and it is intensifying reaction in all directions. In situations dangerous to itself, without wavering it resorts to political blackmail, to repressions, to terror and to punitive actions. Wherever the conventional forms of suppressing laborers do not work, imperialism plants and supports tyrannical dictatorships for direct military reprisal against progressive forces. It generated a wave of terrorism which is overwhelming capitalist society, and it is inciting and provoking national egoism, chauvinism and racism, and contempt toward the rights and interests of other peoples.

"The more strongly the course of historical development undermines the positions of imperialism," the new edition of the CPSU Program notes, "the more hostile toward the interests of the peoples the policy of its most reactionary forces becomes. Imperialism is offering savage resistance to social progress, and it is making attempts to halt the course of history, to subvert the positions of socialism and to take social revenge on a world scale."

The responsibility for war and conflict in our century, for initiating and continually spurring on the arms race and for opening up new directions in this race lies with imperialism, and only imperialism. Imperialism, which was the first to use nuclear weapons, is now preparing to take a new and a possibly irreversible step--shifting the arms race into space, setting its cross-hairs on the entire planet.

Imperialism created a refined system of neocolonialism. Brutal exploitation of developing states is becoming an increasingly more important factor in the financing of imperialism's militaristic preparations, its domestic policies and its very existence. Imperialism is rendering increasingly stronger opposition to all mankind.

U.S. imperialism is demonstrating especially clearly pronounced aggressiveness. The most shameful pages of its history include the bloody war against Vietnam, the Cuban blockade of many years, violation of the legal rights of the Palestinians, intervention in Lebanon, armed seizure of defenseless Grenada, aggressive actions against Nicaragua and the undeclared war against Afghanistan. Among the number of facts of American imperialism's aggressiveness which confirm the true essence of U.S. policy we cannot ignore violation of the USSR state border by American warships on 13 March of this year in the Black Sea, by the southern Crimean coast. This was a demonstrative, challenging action which pursued clearly provocative goals.

Intensification of the aggressiveness of American imperialism reveals itself most graphically in its military strategic conceptions. They change often, but their clearly pronounced anti-Soviet, aggressive orientation persists. Moreover the main accent is always laid on sudden initiation of a war, on anticipatory strikes, on waging large-scale offensive operations with decisive goals from the very beginning of combat activities.

The American "Star Wars" program—that is, a program to create and deploy space strike armaments, clumsily masqueraded as the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), represents a great danger today.

In a time when the USSR and other socialist countries are developing peaceful creative plans for the next five-year plan and for the longer range, the Pentagon has already "planned" its malicious activities. They are formulated in particular in the "Defense Directive for the 1985-1989 Fiscal Year," according to which around \$2 trillion are to be spent to build up military power. The USA is intensively deploying ground-, air- and sea-based strategic offensive forces, and it is developing weapons based on new physical principles. The number of American medium-range missiles in Europe is growing. The United States is reorganizing its armed forces with an eye on significantly enhancing their combat potentials.

Other NATO countries are also making similar military preparations.

"The main goal of these actions," emphasized USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov in his speech to the 27th CPSU Congress, "is to attain decisive military superiority over the USSR and to obtain a possibility for threatening to make a first nuclear strike. Thus a real threat of initiating a war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is being created. And this is something which we must reckon with."

2. The Concern of the Party and the Soviet People for Raising the Country's Defense Capabilities and the Fighting Power of the Armed Forces

Considering the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo are devoting
unwavering attention to strengthening the country's defense capabilities
and the fighting power of our armed forces. "The Soviet Army and Navy,"
it was noted in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the
27th CPSU Congress, "possess modern armament and equipment; they have welltrained personnel, commanders and political workers who are trained and
selflessly devoted to the people. They are performing their duty honorably
in highly complex and sometimes critical situations. We can declare today
with full confidence that the defensive might of the USSR is being maintained
at a level which is permitting dependable protection of the peaceful labor
and peaceful life of the Soviet people."

Communist Party leadership of military construction and of the armed forces is the foundation for strengthening the defense of the socialist motherland. This leadership is maintained over many directions of the activities of the Soviet people, state organs and public organizations concerned with maintaining the country's defense capabilities and the fighting power of the army and navy at the needed level.

To explain this principle in its widest meaning, the lesson leader should recall that by attaching enormous historical importance to the tasks of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development, the 27th CPSU Congress

thus expressed its firm resolve to erect a new, mighty material base with the purpose of not only raising the people's welfare but also strengthening the country's defense capabilities. In particular, an economic potential approximately equal in its scale to that accumulated in all of the previous years of Soviet rule is to be created, and the national income and industrial production volume are to be almost doubled in the next 15 years; labor productivity must increase by a factor of 2.3-2.5 in 15 years.

The CPSU is playing the leading role in developing policies concerned with the country's defense and determining the paths of creation, reinforcement and improvement of the military organization, with equipping the armed forces and with training and indoctrinating the personnel; in developing military doctrine—the system of viewpoints on the essence, goals and nature of a possible future war, on the preparations the country and the armed forces must make for such a war and on the means of waging this war; in consistently implementing military doctrine which, as was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, is purely defensive in nature and oriented on defense from without.

Under the leadership of the CPSU the Soviet people and the army and navy personnel are doing everything necessary to insure that the USSR Armed Forces would be maintained at a level excluding strategic superiority of the forces of imperialism, and to improve the country's defense capabilities in every possible way and strengthen the fighting fraternity of the armies of the fraternal countries of socialism. The party is invariably concerned to see that the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces would be a strong alloy of military proficiency, a high level of equipment, ideological stead-fastness, organization and discipline of the personnel, and their faithfulness to their patriotic and international duty.

The propagandist must explain to his audience the essence of each of these components, which in their unity make up the fighting potential of our armed forces.

Military proficiency occupies the first place. And this is no accident. People who have studied and assimilated complex modern equipment and weapons to perfection and who have mastered the most effective procedures of their use are precisely the ones who win in combat. Military proficiency includes high professional and special training of each serviceman and of military subunits for fulfillment of combat missions and of the responsibilities of duty. It is determined by the knowledge and practical skills of the personnel, by their ability to hit the enemy from great range, with the first shot or launch, and to utilize all of the fighting qualities of the weapons and military equipment. Because modern weapons are crew-operated, coordination of actions and the combat unity of subunits, mutual understanding and mutual assistance between combat crewmen, and confidence in their proficiency are acquiring highly important significance.

Extensive development of socialist competition in the troops and fleets and maintenance of a spirit of rivalry between soldiers as they perform their responsibilities with combat equipment and weapons promote higher military proficiency.

A competition was initiated in this training year with the slogan "We Will Fulfill the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, and Dependably Protect the Accomplishments of Socialism!" Now that the winter training period is coming into an end, the propagandist enjoys favorable possibilities for describing the results of the socialist competition, its effectiveness and its influence on improving the military proficiency of the personnel, and for revealing shortcomings and omissions in training. Such a discussion should be carried on in each group with regard for its unique features and for the results of combat and political training attained prior to the 27th CPSU Congress and by the end of the training period.

Models of diligence and purposefulness in mastering equipment and weapons may be demonstrated using the initiators of the socialist competition in the particular branch of the armed forces, district, group of forces or fleet as examples.

As an example the Guards twice-awarded order-bearing tank regiment of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District under the command of Guards Colonel A. Grigorash has earned glory in the ground troops. His unit initiated the competition in the ground troops. Every other serviceman attained outstanding training results by the opening of the 27th CPSU Congress. The time it takes to fulfill combat standards was reduced significantly in the regiment. All tactical exercises are conducted with grades of "excellent" and "good," even at night. Equipment and armament is operated competently and maintained in exemplary fashion. Targets are hit day and night in minimum time, at maximum range, with the first shot, with the first round. An active struggle is being waged to increase the time of operation of tanks and wheeled vehicles between repairs, and to augment and improve the training material and equipment base.

The next factor of fighting potential is a high level of equipment availability in the armed forces. Combat equipment and weapons are the material foundation of an army's might. The availability of equipment in the armed forces and the quantity and quality of weapons depend wholly on the country's economic development and on its level of material production. The propagandist should mention that today our economy, science and technology are at such a high level that the USSR is capable of creating, within the shortest time, any form of weapon upon which the enemies of peace might wish to stake their future, including space weapons. "Were it to be subjected to a real threat from space," stressed M. S. Gorbachev, "the Soviet Union would find effective countermeasures...."

Today our army and navy are at the level of modern requirements. In terms of the availability and characteristics of equipment, they are far beyond what they were at the moment of the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War. This is graphically evident in every armed service. The strategic nuclear forces—the strategic missile forces and the strategic forces of the navy and air force, which are in constant readiness for an immediate retaliatory blow—are the foundation of the fighting power of the Soviet state's army and navy. General—purpose forces are also developing within the limits necessary for defense: ground troops, antiaircraft troops,

aviation and naval forces. Conventional weapons underwent fundamental change in the postwar years as well. The fire power and maneuvering possibilities of formations in all of the armed services have risen by several orders of magnitude.

The ideological steadfastness of the personnel and their faithfulness to their patriotic and international duty occupy a special place in the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. This is natural. Only a person who is ideologically convinced, who acts consciously and who has perfect mastery of the equipment can remain the main and decisive force in war. What V. I. Lenin said is important even today: "In any war, in the final analysis victory depends on the morale of the masses which must shed their blood on the battlefield" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 121).

In its activities our party guides itself strictly by these Leninist principles; it is continually augmenting the spiritual elements of the fighting power of the armed forces and devoting priority attention to forming the new man--a builder and defender of the socialist motherland.

As was noted in the 27th CPSU Congress, the party's central concern is indoctrinating the people in the spirit of high ideals and devotion to communism, Soviet patriotism and proletarianism, socialist internationalism, a conscious attitude toward labor and public property, ever-increasing communion with the treasures of spiritual culture, and eradication of customs which contradict the socialist way of life.

This approach to solving the problems of indoctrination creates objective prerequisites for forming, in the Soviet citizen, a love for the motherland of October and for the land in which he was born and raised, and a sense of class solidarity with all who fight against imperialism and for social progress and peace, and it generates heroism in our soldier in the course of combat training and during their fulfillment of their patriotic and international duty in Afghanistan.

It would be pertinent to emphasize that such acts of heroism are equal to the heroism of war veterans. Sometimes our servicemen in Afghanistan walk into ambushes, rescue their adopted Afghan brothers, and save the lives of their comrades-in-arms; sometimes they owe their lives to fellow soldiers in their own units. They march through fire, helping the people and army of a friendly country. This story is told in an interesting, very readable form in the book "Zvezdy podviga: na zemle Afganistana" [The Stars of Heroism: On the Land of Afghanistan] (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985), the contents of which are recommended for training purposes.

Concluding presentation of the second issue, the lesson leader should reach the following conclusion: The 27th CPSU Congress determined tasks of enormous historical importance--accelerating the country's socioeconomic development and promoting our forward movement toward communism. All of this, together with growth of the motherland's national wealth and of the public welfare,

will serve to raise the country's defense capabilities, the fighting power of our armed forces and their fighting potential.

3. Tightening Military Discipline--The Duty of Every Serviceman

It is important to emphasize in the discussion of this issue that organization and discipline of the personnel are the most important elements of the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, permeating all of its other factors. Discipline is the basis of order, of efficient fulfillment of combat training plans, and a guarantee of high-quality equipment maintenance and service in general. The tighter discipline is, and the higher the organization and order in the subunit, unit and ship, the more significant are the successes in combat training and in improving the occupational proficiency of the soldiers, and the more confident is the movement forward in all areas of raising the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces.

All of the glorious history of our army and navy persuasively shows that firm conscious discipline is the most important prerequisite of victory on the battlefield, and of success in combat training and service.

This is why such great significance is attached to tightening discipline in the units and aboard the ships. It is also important to emphasize here that this line is a reflection of the party's general orientation toward fighting all negative phenomena in the consciousness and behavior of people. "The party," it was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, "attaches priority significance to consistent and persistent eradication of violations of labor discipline, misappropriations and bribery, speculation and parasitism, drunkenness and vandalism, private ownership psychology and money-grubbing, groveling and servility. The authority of public opinion and the force of law must be utilized fully in the struggle against these phenomena."

Explaining the significance of firm military discipline, the lesson leader should emphasize specially that its role and significance are growing increasingly larger in the present stage of development of the armed forces. Why is this? First because of the continuous influx of new military equipment into the army and navy. After all, the slightest lack of diligence, the slightest carelessness of a soldier or seaman working with crew-operated weapons may cause failure of the combat mission. Firm discipline and organization are the basis of order and of exceptional effectiveness in servicing and operating equipment and weapons.

It is important to consider that with the appearance of nuclear missiles, the content of military discipline has widened significantly; it has become deeper and more broad. Concepts such as the discipline of combat duty, time discipline, the discipline of operating equipment and weapons, and the discipline of the personal and collective responsibility of soldiers for fulfilling assigned missions have occupied a strong place in the practice of daily service. All of these concepts should doubtlessly be treated as a single whole defining the degree of discipline of the personnel. Every soldier is required to display maximally effective and accurate fulfillment

of military oaths, military regulations and orders from commanders, and faultless execution of orders and organization, since the slightest display of carelessness and lack of discipline can have grave consequences. Using concrete examples from the life of a subunit or ship, the propagandist must show what is required from each serviceman in order to unify the military collective and to create a healthy moral climate, friendship, troop comradeship and mutual aid within it.

As an example the soldiers of one of the military district's outstanding battalions, in which Major N. Reznik is the deputy commander for political affairs, are living and studying as a unified fighting family, welded together by strong bonds of military brotherhood. They honorably fulfilled their pledges in behalf of an honorable welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress. What makes their ranks so strong? The answer given by the battalion's officers, sergeants and soldiers is the same: "Tight discipline."

The struggle for organization, for discipline, for exemplary order and, on this basis, for unification of the collective is waged constantly in this battalion. As an example, once new soldiers arrived. Discussions were held in the Lenin rooms on the topics "Tell Us About Yourself" and "Let's Get Acquainted!" Evening discussions on the following topics have become traditional for young soldiers: "The Oath in Your Heart and Mine," "Glorious Is the Disciplined Soldier," "On Friendship, Comradeship and Military Brotherhood," "What Does Military Duty Mean to You?" The most important prerequisites of maintaining a healthy microclimate in the battalion are ensuring strict order, exemplary service and intolerance of any deviations from the norms of communist morality.

It is no accident that discipline is called the first valor of a soldier, the basis of the mass heroism of frontline soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. The present generation of the motherland's defenders is also giving the country its heroes. Among them are those who serve watches on distant latitudes of the World Ocean and conquer space conscientiously, as required by the oath and by military regulations, and those who distinguish themselves in assimilating new combat equipment and in fights with Dushman bands on the territory of our friend Afghanistan.

The parachute platoon commanded by Guards Lieutenant M. Ivanenko was operating away from the battalion's main forces. Crossing three rough Afghan mountain ranges, the paratroopers reached a flat summit which turned out to be a Dushman base. A fight ensued. The soldiers fulfilled the officer's orders sharply, displaying the highest organization and self-control. Guards Private Mikhail Ladeyshchikov noticed a bandit rising from behind a boulder, sighting his weapon on the commander. The soldier had but a fraction of a second to make a decision. And so he threw himself into the path of the bullet. What raised the soldier to this step, to the summit of human and military heroism? Surely there is no one answer to this question: There was love for the motherland and the commander, faithfulness to the laws of troop comradeship, and of course, the highest discipline.

The lesson leader should state the names of the leading soldiers of his subunit, those who are models of industriousness, and those who serve as examples in training and service. He should describe how the personnel and members of the study group are mastering the equipment, operating and maintaining it, improving the training material and equipment base and raising their occupational proficiency. It is very important to note in this case that what has been achieved by the soldier is but one step along the path toward new summits in combat proficiency, to point out the unutilized reserves, and to orient the audience on proficient mastery of combat equipment and weapons, on tightening discipline and organization and on maintaining strict order in the subunit or unit and aboard the ship.

New, important and complex tasks that must be carried out in the summer training period lie ahead. Their fulfillment will require great exertion of effort, high organization, further improvement of work quality at all levels, and firm implementation of the course adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress toward raising exactingness and decisively eliminating shortcomings and omissions. These tasks must be carried out with honor.

Completing the presentation of the material of this topic, the propagandist should reach this conclusion: The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the wise domestic and foreign policy of our party, which is unwaveringly following Lenin's course, are eliciting, in army and navy personnel as well as in all Soviet people, a high patriotic upsurge, a desire to honorably fulfill the tasks imposed on them, and to fight persistently, with all responsibility, for high combat readiness of the armed forces.

The following documentary chronicles and popular scientific films may be shown to members of the study group during independent study: "I Serve the Soviet Union," "Strategic Missilemen" and others.

Asking the members of the study group the following questions is recommended during the discussion: 1. In what way is the aggressiveness of imperialism manifested in the present stage? 2. In what basic directions is the CPSU providing leadership to raising the country's defense capabilities and the fighting power of the armed forces? 3. What are the factors of the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces? 4. What is responsible for the growing role of military discipline in modern conditions? 5. What are the tasks of the soldiers concerned with raising military proficiency and tightening organization and discipline?

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

FOLLOW UP: IMPACT ON OFFICER'S CAREER OF LETTER TO EDITOR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 86 pp 3,4

[Article by Lt Col V. Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "A Line in the Biography; History Over Ten Years Old"]

[Text] We recognized each other immediately, even though our first meeting occurred over 11 years ago.

It was then that the editor's office received a letter discussing cases of eyewash. Having adopted the pledge to become an outstanding regiment, by the end of the training year it was declared as such. But in the opinion of the author of the letter, tank battalion commander Captain S. Bogun, such a high evaluation was in fact nothing but the most brazen hogwash.

"I can prove this with my own battalion as an example," he said to the reporters when they met.

By the way, the battalion was also declared to be outstanding. And such high results meant that the battalion commander was sure to get at least a bonus, if not a regular promotion.

He was certain that no one was going to shake his hand after sending such a letter to the editor's office. But he hardly thought that all of the rest of his life would go on beneath the echoes of this sensational story.

I recall how scrupulously and passionately he demonstrated to us all of the absurdity and perniciousness of elevating the privates and sergeants of his subunit to the rank of outstanding soldiers. There were gross violations of military discipline in the battalion, and the personnel were often excused from planned combat training lessons for various kinds of house-keeping details. Bogun said all of this in the presence of his superiors, who stood in bewilderment as they beseeched him with a threatening tone:

"Do you know what you're saying, Comrade Captain?!"

He knew, and he talked. As it turned out, the same hogwash was even more abundant in other of the regiment's subunits.

Following publication of the critical report "In Unprincipled Soil" the regiment lost its outstanding title, and many officials of the unit, formation and district suffered the strictest service and party reprimands. One was dismissed from the army while others were demoted or received warnings that their work was deficient. But after some time a few of the persons guilty of the eyewash reassumed important positions.

It cannot be said that Bogun was alone in his struggle for justice, for principles. Some openly supported him. Take as an example regimental chief of staff Major P. Shklyaruk. Together with the report of the results of the final inspection written for show, he gave the commission the original version, which contained less than outstanding grades. This cost Shklyaruk his position. He was dismissed, of all things, "for untidy work." He was demoted. Others were warned as well: Don't stick your nose into something that's not your business! And so regimental party bureau secretary Captain N. Ananyev and unit deputy commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Krysin kept their noses out of it. Regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Shchelkalin, a person who remains objective right to the point where his subordinates begin to wash their dirty linen in public, also assumed a negative position in relation to Bogun.

They decided to teach Bogun a lesson. But this was not an easy thing to do, considering Bogun's personality. He was never one to criticize in the hope of obtaining personal advantage. His subordinates loved him, and all knew him as an active communist who was exacting of himself.

How could someone like this be taught a lesson? How can one settle accounts with a person motivated by faith in final justice? Hard as it was to find an excuse, one was found. Eyewash had been discovered in his battalion, and Bogun himself passionately admitted so. Consequently he had to be punished! Of course, at first Bogun was thanked for his effort. For revealing this "malignancy."

He was demoted: He was appointed battalion chief of staff. Bogun accepted the post fully cognizant of what was going on, and as usual, he devoted himself fully to his work. Then it was suggested to him that it would be better for him to leave the regiment voluntarily, because the attitude that had developed in the unit and in the formation toward the "author" would hardly change. Bogun consented to the post of deputy rayon military commissar in Kalinin Oblast.

This was perhaps the first and last weakness he displayed in his entire career.

Soon after, letters were sent to the highest authorities in his defense. The command of the district and the division once again had to deal with Bogun's case. The officer was returned to the formation. First as battalion chief of staff and then as battalion commander.

Not a single reference to shortcomings could be found in his confidential reports, party reports and records, even in those "tumultuous" times for

him. Even superiors with the best memories could not find the slightest irregularities in Bogun's work and life.

Later on, reviewing Bogun's personal file I could not help noticing one line in his autobiography: "In 1974 I wrote a letter to the editor's office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA." I think there was a reason why he put it in. He did so to explain why an officer, a senior lieutenant who had been entrusted with a battalion, was moved so slowly up the ladder of his career over those many long years. And why the doors to the academy were shut in the face of this person, so truly talented in military affairs. And why a party reprimand for eyewash which he himself had uncovered was allowed to remain in his file for 3 years.

I am still tormented by this question: How could this have happened? would seem that the regiment had a strong party and officer collective which had defended principled positions in relation to many issues. But why had this collective not defended Bogun or, more accurately, the vital rightness of his words? I can recall a party election meeting held in the unit at which former party bureau secretary Captain N. Ananyev was voted out for his unprincipled behavior in this issue. And it was left at that. I recall the opinion of Bogun stated in those distant days by the regiment commander and by the division commander: "A promising officer, an exemplary communist." Incidentally, both did help Bogun a little later on, but they did so with some apprehension. It might be thought that they were apprehensive of the anger of their superiors. But the truth of the matter is that those superiors based their own decisions on the opinions of that regiment commander and that division commander! Everyone lacked the party and service honor to say that Bogun was right and they were wrong. To say that not so much in Bogun's interests, even though they were far from secondary, as in behalf of the interests of the overall cause.

And so another meeting. A scar on his face, a Red Star ribbon on his chest. Noting my interest, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Vladimirovich Bogun briefly stated:

"Afghanistan."

I recalled my talk with district staff officer Lieutenant Colonel T. Struchka about the collected and valorous officer Bogun, with whom he had performed his international duty. Once in order to maintain his authority a senior supervisor tried to report the combat situation to the higher staff in less than an accurate way. What was involved here was not so much hogwash as losses in combat. The first to openly attack his dishonesty was Bogun. The lover of happy stories was soon removed from his post.

"Yes, that did happen," confirmed Sergey Vladimirovich.

Then I recall my talks in the district headquarters about a certain "eccentric" who submitted, frankly speaking, unusual documents to the inspectors in the course of the unit's final exams. It was clear from these documents that his subordinates had not been in the training classrooms or at the

practice range for several weeks owing to the peculiar circumstances that had evolved. Moreover with pencil in hand he helped the inspectors determine that the combat training program had been exactly 67.4 percent completed. Giving the inspectors such a trump card was unheard of!

And so they asked him: What, dear man, were you doing instead? The "eccentric" gave a detailed reply: On orders from senior chiefs, his subordinates were compelled to work so many man-days at a local reinforced concrete article plant in exchange for materials needed for construction of facilities for the training material base. He itemized the exact number of soldiers that were detailed to erect these facilities, and the number of months it took. He itemized the number of soldiers working at a livestock complex, even though these soldiers were officially listed as being on active duty. Inspectors are people, and they know that life must go on, that construction is something that must go on as well. But why focus attention on such discrepancies in combat training and in performing housekeeping functions so blatantly? The inspectors did what they could to gain an understanding of this "eccentric." They immediately went to his senior chiefs and told them about his unprecedented brashness. And they replied: Leave Bogun alone, you can't teach an old dog new tricks.

He had a notebook on his desk with some kind of graphs showing. I asked him to explain them. These, it turned out, were "photographs of the work day" of battalion and regimental officers. They revealed several hours spent on various kinds of drills, on formations for lessons, on meetings, conferences and assemblies. Take at least one of the recent days. Formations took more than an hour. Conferences and meetings took over 2 hours. How can we consider the effectiveness of the labor of officers when not more than 3 or 4 hours a day remains for training and indoctrination? And Bogun goes around waving these graphs in the faces of the unit commanders in an effort to reduce this bureaucratic behavior.

I couldn't understand his concern. These are things which a division deputy commander must do by the nature of his position. And so I counseled him: "Can't you just tell them to do it?"

"I don't have the power to do so, and apparently I never will, because formally I am only a battalion commander."

"?1?"

I could not conceal my amazement, because the sign on the door to the office of the deputy division commander bore his name, but in fact he only had the power of a battalion commander!

It all began just 2 years ago, when division deputy commander Colonel V. Shchelkalin went away for a long period of temporary duty. He was the same man who was regiment commander when Captain Bogun wrote that letter to the editor, and who would not suffer his subordinate's frankness. But he knew exactly what this "inconvenient" Bogun was actually made of! And it was

Shchelkalin himself who proposed that Bogun should serve as acting division deputy commander until his return from temporary duty. The temporary appointment was coordinated at all levels, including with the district first deputy troop commander. Colonel V. Shchelkalin never returned to the division-he received another appointment. And so Bogun remained acting deputy division commander. A month passed and another, then half a year, and a year. And so there he was, with the most modest powers but with the greatest range of responsibilities. This is how he arrived at his dual position. In order to correct deficiencies in training organization for example, Bogun had to appeal to the regiment commanders, including the commander of his own regiment, to whom he, a battalion commander, was formally subordinated. For the sake of justice it should be noted that the regiment commanders understood the situation correctly, and no conflicts ever arose on this basis.

Several years ago it was written in black and white in Lieutenant Colonel Bogun's performance report: "Deserves a promotion to regimental chief of staff." Others suggested even more: elevating Bogun to regiment commander. But alas, the personnel organs prevented this from happening: The officer had not yet served long enough, and most importantly, he had not yet been to the military academy. That was true. Considering the hell that he had to go through for so many years, was there even any hope of his going to the academy?

Half a year ago Lieutenant Colonel S. Bogun was appointed to the position of unit deputy commander by order of the district troop commander. The possibility is not excluded that this may be Bogun's last position, despite his experience, talent and diligence. Despite, finally, the fact that this was a person whose morals were something toward which many would hope to aspire.

I wrote this article about my old acquaintance in order that those who serve with him would know his biography as it really is, so that not only Bogun's selfless military labor today but also his party boldness would be evaluated as they should. This story does in fact have a bearing on a deeper understanding of the changes presently occurring in the life of our society. In the same way, it would be prudent for us to think about the subsequent fate of this communist officer.

I don't know what we need to do to make it possible for Bogun to reveal his capabilities and talent to their full scope, to the scale of which he is capable. But one thing I am certain of: We must not keep such people in the shadows.

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITORIAL: CONGRESS, PARTY IMPACT ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 86 p 1

[Editorial: "A Firm Alloy"]

[Excerpts] The 27th CPSU Congress noted that acceleration of the country's social-economic development is the key to all our problems: short-term and long-term, economic and social, political and ideological, domestic and foreign. It is only in this way that a new qualitative state of Soviet society can and must be achieved. The fifteen-year period which our country is entering is an important historical period along the path of improving socialism and building communism. In the next 15 years we plan to double the country's production potential, substantially change the very makeup of our economy and the character of labor, and reorganize the people's way of life.

These grand creative tasks demand comprehensive support, the most important component of which is reliable protection of the socialist homeland and a strengthening of national security.

The fundamental basis for strengthening the defense of the socialist Motherland is the Communist Party's management of military organizational development and the Armed Forces. National defense policy and Soviet military doctrine aimed at defense against outside aggression are developed and implemented under the party's managing role. The establishment of military equilibrium between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO bloc was a convincing result of our party's activity and a historic achievement of socialism.

The new wording of the CPSU Program stresses that the party will continue to show invariable concern that the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is a firm alloy of military proficiency and high technical outfitting, ideological staunchness, efficiency and discipline of personnel, and their allegiance to patriotic and international duty.

Our Army and Navy are evolving in accordance with the achievements of scientific-technical progress and have been outfitted with first-rate weapons and combat equipment thanks to the party's concerns and the efforts of all the people. The strategic nuclear forces, which are in constant readiness for immediate delivery of an attack, are the foundation of the Soviet Armed

Forces' combat might. The fire and maneuver capabilities of units of all branches of the Armed Forces have increased by many times. But people are the principal force of the Army and Navy. The professional makeup of our Armed Forces is constantly being strengthened. Highly educated, competent, politically mature commanders and political officers are called upon to effectively resolve problems of the personnel's training and indoctrination, a fundamental improvement in military discipline, and an increase in unit and ship combat readiness.

Socialist competition directed toward successful implementation of congress resolutions is actively underway among the troops. By their specific actions and by displaying initiative, persistence and efficiency, military collectives are struggling for a further improvement in combat proficiency, comparing their training and labor rhythm with the reorganization and acceleration process which is picking up the pace in the country. Reserves are being identified which must be set in motion to successfully fulfill the high socialist pledges. The political awareness and patriotic attitude toward performance of official duty of the Motherland's armed defenders are displayed in a deep understanding that the Armed Forces' combat potential finds real embodiment in the effectiveness of military labor.

The nuclear-powered missile submarine commanded by Capt 1st Rank V. Ivanov, which was the initiator of socialist competition in the Navy, recently returned from a lengthy ocean deployment. The ship successfully accomplished all assigned missions and earned an outstanding evaluation. The initiators found an opportunity to achieve a significant addition in increasing the ship's combat potential. Suffice it to note that the nuclear submariners learned to significantly better many norms which were rigid even before, taking the time saving to 20-25 percent in performing the most difficult operations of making weapons and equipment ready for action. These achievements of the foremost crew were adopted by the personnel of other ships and are being disseminated in the fleet.

Many such examples could be cited which attest to the Soviet military personnel's deep awareness of the high demands of the time. Energy, initiative and imagination become a vivid expression of the social activeness of Army and Navy personnel, the desire to respond with action to the party's call to improve vigilance, efficiency and combat proficiency.

It is noteworthy that Soviet military personnel invariably link their role in raising the Armed Forces' combat potential with a comprehensive mobilization of their inner reserves. Yes, no matter how much combat equipment and weapons are improved and no matter how much their might increases, the principal, deciding role in modern warfare rests with man. His professional expertise, morale, schooling, efficiency and physical conditioning serve as a very important condition for realizing the material basis of combat potential. And when the talk in the subunit and unit or aboard ship turns to real ways to improve combat readiness, questions of the fullest activation of the human factor must be posed first.

This is greatly facilitated by an improvement in the level of organizing activity of commanders, staffs and political bodies; by an increase in the

role of party and Komsomol organizations in mobilizing personnel for highly effective, creative military labor; and by an improvement in the real indicators of labor. Today one must see behind this not only conscientious, determined combat training, but also a significant improvement in its quality and unconditional adherence to the principle of learning what is necessary in war. Development of the personnel's high moral-political, psychological and combat qualities must be oriented toward this. Communist conviction, ideological maturity, valor, courage, the combat proficiency of Soviet military personnel, and a readiness to selflessly come to the Motherland's defense and worthily perform one's patriotic and international duty are an invaluable property of our Armed Forces.

ARMED FORCES

MILITARY COOPERATION IN CHERNOBYL CLEAN-UP

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jun 86 p 6

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent O. Gusev, Kiev Oblast: "A Movie Show for the Third Shift -- The Chernobyl AES: Chronicle of Events"]

[Text] Officer N. Goncharenko received this day a not entirely usual mission. He was to decontaminate; i.e., clean of radioactive dust, the facilities of the local movie theater. His objective was to organize a show at the request of those who are working in the accident zone. I will say immediately that the mission which the chemical troops accomplished was fulfilled on time. The film was held in a hall filled to overflowing. Then it was suggested that the number of showings be increased. The third shift also needed to go to the movies.

For the chemical troops commanded by Officer V. Kolpin the front line passed right through the center of events. They were assigned to decontamination of a number of streets in Pripyat, the city of power station workers. The personnel of the subunits commanded by Sr Lt A. Voronin and Capt N. Kuleykin start powerful streams from specialized vehicles -- truck-mounted spraying units (ARS) -- delivering them to the walls and windows of the highest houses. With brushes, and where it is especially difficult with scrapers and even knives, the "soldiers of cleanliness" work, dressed in special protective gear. At first glance they are engaged in not particularly difficult work; cleaning the equipment which is returning from the industrial site. But, if one considers that every vehicle, tractor or armored transporter is bringing from the zone of the damaged reactor a portion of radioactive residue and that it is absolutely necessary to clean them off, it becomes clear how crucial is the work of drivers V. Fedorychev, N. Borodinov and the other men servicing the ARS.

It is difficult to look through the rainbow of the streams, but to Maj V. Bushin each of his subordinates working in the personal cleansing station in no way looks like the others. Each soldier, whether Sgt Kraynov, Jr Sgt Golov or Pvt Batalov has his own approach, but an identical, painstaking attitude toward the work. The businesslike support provided by local specialists also assists the soldiers. I saw how precisely and harmoniously, shoulder-to-shoulder with the soldiers, worked B. Shinkarenko, a deputy

department chief at the Chernobyl AES, and A. Kurunov, radiation control instrument repair foreman.

"The closest cooperation, assistance and mutual aid among army and civilian services within the 30 kilometer zone," noted Maj Gen M. Zarochentsev, "is a feature of the present situation at the Chernobyl bridgehead. People have become warmer and more friendly and tried to help one another as much as possible, seeking any opportunity to ease the work of their comrades and create for them the safest possible conditions."

The crew led by Senior Sergeant A. Kostomakha, CPSU candidate member, during its reconnaissance detected a corridor in the area of the station with a very low level of radiation. Its armored transport vehicle led three truck mounted cranes along this route and then for many more hours in succession delivered AES [nuclear electric power plant] workers to the damaged reactor. And, to take an everyday aspect of today's bivouacking life, if necessary the mobile shop salesperson leaves his doors open late, until the last purchaser is served. The portable film projector journeys many dozens of kilometers of country road so that the start of a showing is not delayed. Even at night you will find a bucket of flowers to greet a Name-Day Soldier who is returning from a mission.

Recently the soldiers of Lt Col I. Kitaygorodskiy so greeted the Fedotov brothers. Vitaliy is a junior sergeant and his brother Vasilii is an electric welder. They are working with other soldiers both on the distant and close approaches to the accident site. They work at the distant approaches in order to lay wider and more convenient roads more quickly to the reactor, and at the close approaches in order to do everything that is required to eliminate the consequences of the accident.

The experience acquired by the brothers before their army service while working on the Druzhba and Pomary - Uzhgorod petroleum pipelines helps them rapidly to arc weld the pipes along which concrete for the industrial sites comes. The brothers not only are excellent welders. They proposed that their section get by with only one servo-mechanism where yesterday there were still two.

"And this means," explained Sr Lt I. Denisyuk "that the brothers' suggestion made it possible to remove at least one tractor operator from the danger zone."

Yes, at times the truth of the old, but not obsolete soldiers' principle, "watch over yourself and your comrade," is demonstrated so graphically. And the behavior of Sr Sgt F. Kulyba in emergency situations is dictated by the no less noble desire to eliminate the mishap a bit more quickly. He and his squad did everything possible, getting by initially with an ordinary instrument, in order with maximum rapidity to break through a multi-meter thick concrete wall for cooling pipelines to pass through. Or consider the enthusiasm of the subordinates of Sr Lt V. Timoshenko. All communists, non-party soldiers and komsomol members are conducting themselves at the front as true Bolsheviks.

Private V. Dyatlov, Sr Sgt B. Omelchuk and officers A. Babiychuk and N. Litvin are working on the most important line, right at the reactor. They are conducting radiation reconnaissance and ground decontamination. And they are doing everything at maximum speed, systematically exceeding the norms.

The soldiers involved in eliminating the accident learned with satisfaction about the high evaluation of their work made by a governmental commission.

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ARMED FORCES

CONFERENCE LOOKS AT PRE-DRAFT WORK BY GEORGIAN AGENCIES

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 30 Mar 86 p 2

[GRUZINFORM article: "Worthy Replacements for the Country's Armed Forces"]

[Text] The absolute majority of soldiers from Georgia who last year filled out the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces are excellently prepared for military service and are performing their patriotic and international duty with honor. This was stressed at a republic conference in Tbilisi which discussed results of work to prepare the youth for military service and to select candidates for higher military schools in 1985, and which discussed tasks for 1986.

Taking part in the conference were leading party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol workers; representatives of a number of ministries and departments, and of military commissariats; and members of republic draft and medical commissions.

A briefing was given by GSSR Military Commissar Maj Gen L. L. Sharashenidze.

Speaking at the conference were the republic's ministers of health and education G. G. Lezhava and N. Sh. Vasadze, Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District] Lt Gen A. N. Kleymenov, Mar Avn G. P. Skorikov, Ch Mar Arty V. F. Tolubko and others.

It was noted in the briefing and the statements that more natives of Georgia have begun to enter higher military schools. Today our republic is represented by a minimum of two of its natives in practically every one of the country's military higher educational institutions. For the first time in the last 25 years, natives of the high-mountain Kazbegskiy, Lentekhskiy, Tianetskiy and Tsagerskiy rayons and of the Chiatura city zone are mastering the profession of officer. Interesting forms of effective propaganda of this heroic profession are being used in Leninskiy, Ordzhonikidzevskiy, Oktyabrskiy and Zavodskoy rayons and in the Rayon imeni 26 komissarov of Tbilisi; in the cities of Kutaisi, Rustavi and Poti; and in Adigenskiy, Zestafonskiy and Tsiteltskaroyskiy rayons.

The conference noted that at the same time, the number of envoys of our republic who have not passed entrance exams to military higher educational institutions or who were expelled from them for poor progress still is high. City and rayon military commissariats are not taking advantage of opportunities to organize together with the Komsomol the work of military-professional orientation of schoolchildren, and they exercise weak direction over the work of military instructors. In assessing the work of its organizations, the republic DOSAAF Central Committee does not take into account what number of people those organizations brought up have been sent to military schools. A precise, uniform system of military commissariat work must be developed for a further improvement in the state of affairs.

The conference discussed measures for an improvement this year in all aspects of the work of preparing boys for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Georgian Central Committee Communist Party Secretary G. N. Yenukidze and Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Administrative Organs Department Chief G. G. Gumbaridze took part in the conference.

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ARMED FORCES

COMMAND INITIATIVE IN TRAINING EXERCISES PRAISED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by Col I. Kovalev, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, under "Command Training" rubric: "Born in a Search"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that spring is a time of special intensity for field problems. Winter combat training is nearing a close and we naturally consider every field outing by subunits as a kind of "ranging" [pristrelka] before inspection. The most careful attention is given of course to officers' professional training, because everything else depends to a decisive extent on the level of such training.

Just how do the officers whom I had occasion to see in tactical problems and exercises lately--in action, as they say--appear in this regard? It is impossible to give an unequivocal answer here. There are plusses and minuses, as the saying goes, but there is also one common feature in the officers' combat work style which cannot help but be pleasing. This is the desire to act in a near-combat situation with imagination, initiative and vigor, without the fear of assuming responsibility.

The last field outing, for example, was indicative in this respect. By the way, it would be more correct to say it was an outing in the mountains.

The tank battalion commanded by Lt Col S. Oganesyan was given a mission to take a pass. After studying the situation carefully, the battalion commander concluded that an attack from the front could not be successful. He had to rack his brains, as the saying goes, to find another solution, and he did. Aerial photography data suggested it. The battalion commander's attention was drawn to a small gorge in one of the photos. The gorge was considered impassable. The "enemy" knew this and, judging from everything, Lt Col Oganesyan did not rule it out that the gorge was left unprotected. Reconnaissance soon confirmed his suppositions. Lt Col Oganesyan immediately decided to take advantage of the opposing side's oversight. The subunit commanded by Capt A. Basov was assigned the mission of enveloping the "enemy" along the gorge. The maneuver demanded a total straining of the soldiers' abilities, but they coped with the difficulties.

It is pleasing to note that many other commanders also demonstrated a detailed knowledge of the nature of modern combat and features of fighting in the mountains during the exercise. They acted professionally, taking full advantage of the factor of surprise and the principle of combat activeness.

How are these qualities acquired? Experience persuades us that an ability to think with tactical competence on the battlefield, initiative, and creativeness develop faster in officers where active training forms predominate in command training: group exercises, short tactical training problems, practices on the terrain. This is understood well in the regiment where Lt Col Oganesyan serves. A constant search goes on here for ways to perfect command training, with special attention given to tactical training which is the basis of field training.

They begin of course with theory. It is axiomatic that the ability to make a substantiated decision independently and without delay in a difficult situation and to effectively employ organic, attached and supporting forces and resources in combat depends to a decisive extent on how thoroughly the commander knows the provisions of combat regulations, manuals and other guidance documents. At the same time, people in the unit are concerned about a sensible combination of officers' theoretical training with their development of practical skills. Lt Col Oganesyan in particular also places great emphasis on this. It was no accident that Capt A. Basov, Lt I. Mukhin, Lt A. Matsepura and other officers of Oganesyan's battalion are distinguished by imagination in exercises.

The opinion exists that it is difficult to place a trainee in conditions prompting creativeness, initiative and inquisitiveness in a base training area where each hill and ravine are familiar. This is of course true to a certain extent, but Lt Col Oganesyan and his colleagues convincingly showed that it is possible to create a near-combat situation even in a familiar training area. These opportunities arise, for example, from changing the direction of attack and counterattacks, changing reference points, creating new obstacles, announcing different narrative problems, making wide use of simulation equipment, and having active opposition from the "enemy."

It is generally known how important it is that commanders be granted greater independence in problems and exercises. The fact is, it is no secret that some exercise directors give trainees such detailed information about the situation and give so much information about the "enemy" and the nature of his actions that an officer then has nothing to think about or be concerned about: not reconnaissance, not stability of communications and control, not logistical support. It also happens where a particular commander is placed within a rigid framework of dependence on the senior commander's solution, completely depriving the trainee of an opportunity to display initiative and do something on his own.

The regiment in question resolutely fights this attitude toward the matter, and this produces results.

People also do not forget about invaluable frontline experience here. Classes are held in the command training system during which particular methods

employed by frontline commanders of fighting, leading the "enemy" astray and reducing the effectiveness of his fire are studied and then used imaginatively. For example, in the last problem with company commanders there was a discussion about how countrymen capably used smokes for camouflage in the war years.

In short, experience convinces us that officers always can be taught initiative and imagination. It is important only to display persistence and go beyond the framework of customary concepts.

IMPORTANCE OF PREDRAFT TRAINING STRESSED

PM111549 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 86 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Preparation for Service"]

[Text] As has already been reported in the press a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution aimed at further improving young people's preparation for military service has been adopted. This document is yet another vivid manifestation of the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to strengthen the country's defense capability and to enhance the USSR Armed Forces' combat might.

The party has seen and continues to see the patriotic and international education of Soviet people and the molding of their readiness to defend the socialist fatherland as an integral component and an important task in all ideological education work. The improvement of the Armed Forces' combat readiness in every possible way and the education of Army and Navy servicemen and all Soviet people in a spirit of vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great gains of socialism, the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress stress, must continue to be one of the most important tasks for the party, state, and people.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution aimed at specifically implementing the congress directives envisages implementing additional measures to raise the level of young people's predraft training and their physical fitness, improve public health, and launch military-patriotic education. The holding of the planned measures is aimed at manning the USSR Armed Forces with young recruits who are ready to worthily carry out their duty in defending the socialist fatherland and protecting Soviet people's peaceful labor.

Today when international tension has intensified through the fault of imperialism, the improvement of young people's preparation for military service is of particular importance. Resolving the important national economic tasks in a complex international situation, the CPSU Central Committee Appeal to the Soviet Union's working people adopted at the CPSU Central Committee June (1986) Plenum says, we are obliged at the same time to maintain our state's defense capability at the necessary level.

Total spiritual mobilization, readiness for possibly severe tests, sound moral, political, and psychological training, and the firm knowledge and habits of military matters are the main criteria which today determine the effectiveness of military-patriotic work with the rising generation-first and foremost predraft and draft-age young people--and raise them to the level of present-day demands. One of the conditions for achieving this is a comprehensive approach to the organization of predraft training, which is implemented under the leadership of party and soviet organs in close cooperation with Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations, organs of national, vocational, and technical education, military commissariats, and military subunits and units. Definite experience of this work has been amassed in Belorussia, and Kuybyshev, Rostov, Bryansk, and Penza Oblasts. Life convinces us that the best results are achieved where the organization of predraft training is geared to the achievement of high quality indicators, where military-patriotic work is conducted in a wellconceived and concrete matter closely coordinated with the training of young people in military matters and with their preparation for service in the Army and Navy, and where war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans, reserve servicemen--particularly those who have seen combat--and cooperation committees at military registration and enlistment offices are actively involved in this work.

It must be admitted that in a number of places predraft preparation is conducted formally, without taking account of the features of military service and the growing demands which it poses draftees. The work is damaged by the absence in teaching establishments of military study rooms, shooting ranges, other material and technical facilities, and the conditions for participation in technical sports and sports with military application. There are still cases of new schools, technical colleges, and agricultural vocational and technical colleges being built, contrary to existing rules, according to old plans which fail to envisage the corresponding base for initial military training, and of local organs of power tolerating this situation. Many educational establishments need to strengthen their military instructors with qualified cadres and DOSAAF schools need teacher cadres and experts in production training. Rural schools require special concern and help.

Military commissariats bear a great responsibility for improving the quality of work with draft-age young people. They are called upon to be concerned to improve the ideological tempering and military and physical training of the future Army and Navy servicemen, to help military instructors improve their methodological skills, and to carry out health measures among young people in collaboration with local organs of power and health care organs. It is important to strive through joint efforts to involve predraft and draft-age young people en masse in regular physical fitness exercises and sport and to promote the development of strength, endurance, smartness, and courage among young people.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Central Committee resolution imposes great and responsible tasks on the defense society organizations. They must develop and introduce into the training process effective modern teaching methods, particularly training complexes, strengthen DOSAAF primary organizations and their material and technical base through help provided on a sponsorship basis by primary organizations at major industrial enterprises, and strive to ensure that all sports clubs using technical equipment completely fulfill their main assignment—to be base centers for the development of technical sports and sports with military applications.

Military units and ships, military training establishments, and Army and Navy Komsomol organizations are called upon to play a great role in the extensive and multifaceted work to improve the standard of youngsters' predraft training. Closer military sponsorship ties should be organized with educational establishments and young people's collectives, patriotic work with and military and vocational guidance for the rising generation should be conducted more actively, and the lofty purport and content of military service should be explained more profoundly. One effective form of involving young people in service is to invite them to a unit or ship, familiarize them with combat equipment, arms, and the lives and leisure of the personnel, and hold open days in military colleges.

Preparing young people to serve in the Army and Navy is a matter of state importance. Successfully implementing it means improving the Armed Forces' combat might and solving the tasks of reliably defending socialist gains.

/9604

CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM IN REVIEW PROCESS FOR INNOVATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 86 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Khoroneko; under the rubric "Notes on Technological Creativity": "A Big Zero in the 'Introduction' Column"]

[Text] Everything seems to be going on all right with efficiency work in one certain unit. At least that is what most officers of the unit head-quarters believe. "We hold one of the first places in the formation," Senior Lieutenant V. Pilipenko proudly said. "We can barely keep up with all of the patent applications." Major V. Belash, who until recently was in charge of the invention commission supported his subordinate's opinion, showing me bulging files containing invention commission minutes and descriptions of efficiency proposals. In fact, in quantitative respects things in this unit were doing all right. But what about quality? After reviewing the documents, the conclusions I arrived at were disturbing. Without a doubt certain creative developments were distinguished by novelty, by originality of technical concept. One such innovation, for example, was given a high assessment at a formation exhibition, winning first place among the exhibits. But frankly speaking, many of the documents amazed me.

Officer S. Novoydarskiy submitted a claim for an efficiency proposal. Its title was quite impressive: "Device for Easy Tie-Down of the Frame of a Missile Transport and Loading Vehicle in Travel Position." But it was obvious from the description that this was just an "ordinary tie-down bracket." You might think that this is funny, but you won't smile when you read the commission's decision: Recognize the work as an efficiency proposal, pay out a reward and issue a certificate.

But neither this nor some other efficiency proposals could be referred to as "technical solutions." A wooden box to store fuses, a method for copying drawings through a backlighted organic glass sheet, a most ordinary extension cord for supplying voltage to a portable oscillograph, and a turntable that could be seen at any pharmacy (accepted enthusiastically by the commission). Then there was the "Pole for Visual Observation of the Presence of Radioactive Substances and War Gases at a Position"--an ordinary tarpaulin awning resting on pins to protect apparatus from rain.

In a word, proposals which are clearly not in keeping with the corresponding requirements of the instructions and which are not innovations are collecting

in the dozens. Bonuses have been paid out for each of them, and they are included in the annual reports, creating the impression of bubbling creative activity and well-being. But in fact, however, these doings cause losses, both material and moral. Such an attitude toward technical creativity generates the opinion that efficiency work is not all that hard, that creativity can be substituted by just the appearance of creativity: Another's idea could be represented as your own, and the old could be represented as the new.

By the way, I do not want to accuse the authors of these "developments" of mercenary interest or eyewash. Some sincerely believed that their proposals were new and original. Others were forced by pressure from above to submit "anything to support the plan." Still others were simply ignorant of the provisions in the instructions. An example is the provision that a proposal cannot be recognized as an efficiency proposal if it is not utilized in other military units or if it is not published).

"Recently at the practice range I saw my neighbors at work," Senior Lieutenant S. Gerasimovich shared his plans for the future with me. "They used an interesting thing--a general-purpose key. I'm presently drawing up a claim, and I'll soon submit another efficiency proposal."

The young officer also told me that many of his developments that have been recognized as efficiency proposals were either borrowed from specialists in other units or taken from technical journals.

Thus we find that high reporting indicators are based on a lack of concern by invention commission members and by a formal approach to the work.

But what is the fate of developments which are in fact innovations, utilization of which could produce a noticeable impact?

In 1984 Major V. Sergeyev proposed an effective device that does not require special material outlays for its manufacture. It was approved by the invention commission and recommended for introduction. Two years have passed since then, but the innovation was never implemented. Why?

"There is so much to do, and not enough time to do it in," replied Major Sergeyev.

Such an explanation sounds strange. In most people's minds an efficiency expert is a person who tries to improve something in deed, and not on paper, who tries to make practical use of his idea. And yet the display reflecting the results of efficiency work for the year documents only the total number of planned and submitted claims, and for some reason the "introduction" column is absent. But even if it were there, there would be many big zeros in it.

In my opinion it is not only the passiveness of certain officers that is to blame. The invention commission was found to be working below its

capabilities. If we think about it, swiveling fire nozzle supports have little meaning to Sergeyev personally, since his work is only indirectly related to fire safety at warehouses and in storehouses. Such an innovation would be needed by those who are directly responsible for property and order in warehouses—by subunit commanders and by supply dump chiefs. They are the ones who should fight for introduction of such an innovation. Moreover the unit headquarters should take the fate of such an innovation under its control.

I can anticipate an objection. Many creative ideas have been practically realized by the innovators themselves, and they are being utilized in the subunits. But can we say that they have been introduced in the full meaning of this word? Can sporadic cases of use of a valuable innovation be treated as evidence of its introduction? Hardly. In my opinion, to introduce an innovation means to widely confirm it through actual use.

One cannot say this about the efficiency proposals that have been submitted in this unit. In his time, for example, Major A. Kiselev suggested improvements on a tester. The commission approved and supported Kiselev's idea and recommended its introduction into all of the subunits. But for example none of Lieutenant Colonel V. Yakovlev's fellow servicemen know anything about this innovation, and not one of the combined instruments has been reequipped appropriately.

I concede that innovators trying to introduce some innovations sometimes encounter shortages of materials, tools and machine units. But analysis showed that most innovations remain as isolated copies for another reasonbecause of indifference toward efficiency work. Sign it and forget it.

Examples of formalism and of indifference toward good ideas are unfortunately not sporadic. Take as an example the electric soldering guns of original design by Major A. Onskul, which facilitate the work of electricians and which have thus far been utilized only by the officer himself; a device for automatically warming up a motor vehicle engine developed by Major V. Kozikov, especially useful in a harsh climate but totally unknown in other collectives; an intercom proposed by Captain V. Kostenko which has never achieved practical utilization. And they all could have produced significant benefit, had they been introduced in the unit in the broad meaning of this word.

Then what role should the invention commission play? Is it to accumulate paperwork and to distribute bonuses? Monetary rewards would hardly bring satisfaction to a business-like, interested individual, or promote growth of his creativity if he sees that his "offspring" is of interest to no one but himself.

Here is something else I would like to bring up. We do not always relate thoughtfully and carefully to developments created by innovators and placed into operation. On many occasions I have seen dilapidated, abandoned electrified displays, broken-down instruments and broken tools created by the hands

of servicemen. Such facts were also encountered in the unit under discussion here.

The efficiency experts of one of the subunits proudly discussed their creativity. And if we overlook the expenses, there was something to be happy about. The innovators introduced many of the innovations in their own work areas. As an example just last year Senior Lieutenant S. Gerasimovich was credited with eight efficiency proposals. But only two of them had been placed into operation. The fate of the rest is disappointing—they got lost, they broke down and so on.

The attitude toward organic equipment is different in the unit. The people do protect this equipment. They understand that it must always be serviceable and reliable. They also remember that there is a law governing the material responsibility of servicemen. But for some reason none of this concern extends to instruments and tools created by innovators. The line of reasoning is that they were made from written-off materials, during time off. And yet, innovators do not work hard just for the sake of something to do. Their objective is to improve labor and the training process, to perfect equipment and to raise combat readiness. Such concern is important. And it must be shown not only by efficiency experts. After all, any innovation that is introduced becomes public property.

It is emphasized in the new edition of the CPSU Program and in the Basic Directions of the USSR's Economic and Social Development adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress that accelerated development of the economy will be based on scientific-technical progress. Raising it to a new, higher level and making a qualitative leap in this respect is one of the main objectives of modern times. To successfully reach it, the work of various scientific research institutes and design offices is not enough. High activity of all Soviet people, their creative labor and decisive support of all that is new and progressive that comes with time are especially important today.

When the work is well organized and when all reserves are actively utilized, the creativity of efficiency experts will help us not only to raise the combat readiness of the subunits and improve the quality of the training process, but it will also make a significant contribution to accelerating scientific-technical progress in general.

And yet, why has this "style" taken root in the unit? One of the reasons is that staff officers treat technical creativity as something secondary, as something supported by public, nonmilitary organizations. When the results of socialist competition are summarized, technical creativity is not taken into account. The party and Komsomol organizations do not express adequate concern for this effort.

A new commission has now been created in the unit. Will it be able to put an end to the laxity, to rise from words to deeds, to begin working as it should? After all, it is time to make up for previous mistakes.

11004

ARMY PAPER CALLS FOR MORE ECONOMY IN TRAINING

PM181001 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jul 86 First Edition p 1

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel S. Ivanov: "Unjustified Expenditure: Strictly Monitoring the Fulfillment of Pledges"]

[Text] Northern Group of Forces—That night the tank company commanded by Captain I. Kuznetsov was to rehearse a routine exercise in fire training. The appointed hour had long since struck, twilight had thickened on the firing range, but the tankmen had not started firing. After arriving at the firing range late, they were now hurriedly eliminating defects in the preparation of hardware and arms.

The first crews did not reach the stage of opening fire until 2 hours after the scheduled time. Shots flashed in the night like lightning. But the sector control center waited in vain for reports of targets being hit. No, the electronic equipment was working normally. It was the firing which was inaccurate.

Logic suggested that the thing to do was to stop firing, carefully study the reasons for the failure, and take every measure to avoid a repetition of the shortcomings in subsequent rounds. But nothing of the kind was done. The firing went on, although the results remained poor. The impression was created that the exercise leader was not concerned about the quality of fire training of his subordinates, but only about how to use up the ammunition as quickly as possible.

The exercise ended. The company returned to its quarters. Of course, both the commander and his subordinates were dissatisfied with the results. They had not managed to take an appreciable step forward toward the combat improvement targets set in the competition. This was spoken of bitterly when the results of the exercise were summed up. But there was another side to the failure—the economic side. Unfortunately, nobody even mentioned this, although the tankmen's pledges contain a point orienting them toward seeking economic expenditure of time and material resources. It was not difficult to calculate how costly the tankmen's unsuccessful session on the firing range had been.

What is disturbing is not only the fact of the extravagance, but the attitude toward it. Of course, before the end of the training year there is still time for the tankmen to pull themselves up in fire training. And they will certainly do this. But at what cost will the end result be achieved? This cannot be considered calmly, when you see this kind of jaunt (you cannot call it anything else) on the firing range.

The CPSU Central Committee appeal to the working people of the Soviet Union mentions savings as one of the main aims of socialist competition. Of course, this also applies to competition in army conditions. We have every opportunity to ensure that high results in combat training are achieved for the lowest possible expenditure of time and resources. Exercises and training sections are planned and the material and technical base for training is being improved with a view to the economic aspect of combat training. And those commanders who try to develop in their subordinates as many as possible of the skills needed in combat even before going into the field, using simulators and other training means for this purpose, are acting correctly.

But as you can see, there are commanders who reason something like this: We'll go into the field, we can learn everything there. In particular, Capt Kuznetsov, it emerged, took his company onto the firing range without having properly studied the subject on tank firing simulators. Yet the foundations of the tankmen's firing skill are laid, as is well known, on the simulators.

The following can also happen. There may be a seemingly insignificant organizational error, yet it has a negative effect on the entire collective's results. For instance, the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant Yu. Lebedinets arrived at the base line on time. Only then was it discovered that the tankmen had forgotten...their helmets with earphones. Eventually they borrowed some helmets from a neighboring subunit which had finished firing. But the nerves resulting from the delay in the exercise affected the results.

In overcoming thriftlessness and extravagance of this kind, much depends on the effectiveness of monitoring of the fulfillment of pledges for savings and thrift. Unfortunately, in some places this is forgotten. And where there is no daily monitoring of the effectiveness of the use of resources directed into combat training, as a rule there are no stable high results. This was the case, in particular, in the winter training period in a number of subunits. They did not allow an overexpenditure of resources, but the training of many specialists proved poor. It emerged that a large proportion of ammunition, fuel, and lubricants was used up literally in the week before the start of the test. So certain subunit commanders were trying to make up lost ground at the end of the training period by means of cramming and a last-minute blitz. Everything they had saved over many months went on this.

But in the regiment where Capt Kuznetsov serves there are subunits which now know to achieve high results in combat training while using material resources economically. Their experience merits the keenest attention. However, due attention is not yet being devoted to studying this experience and introducing it into practice. On this score I talked with company and battalion commanders and officers of the regiment's staff. They all assess self-critically the results of their work in this regard. But it is time to move on from self-criticism to concrete economic work.

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ARMED FORCES

SOKOLOV ADMONISHES NEW ARMED FORCES OFFICERS

PM010947 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jul 86 First Edition pp 1, 3

[TASS report: "To Strengthen Combat Readiness. Kremlin Reception in Honor of Military Academy Graduates"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate held a reception in the Grand Kremlin Palace on 30 July in honor of graduates of military academies. The reception was attended by generals, admirals, and officers of the USSR Armed Forces and of the fraternal socialist countries' armies who have completed their studies in Soviet military educational institutions and the professors and teachers who have trained ideologically tempered and highly skilled specialists for the Army and Navy.

Present at the reception were Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense; N.I. Savinkin, chief of a CPSU Central Committee section; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromayev, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, and Army General P.G. Lushev, USSR first deputy defense ministers; Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; leaders of a number of ministries and departments, USSR deputy defense ministers, and prominent military leaders.

The reception was addressed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. He congratulated the graduates and the personnel of the military academies on this graduation and read out a greetings message from the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers.

The greetings message points out that the academy graduates are entering the troops at a time of an abrupt shift in the life of our society, when the Soviet people have mounted with tremendous enthusiasm an intense struggle to implement the historic 27th CPSU Congress decisions and to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development, and it voices firm confidence that they will work creatively and with initiative and devote their knowledge, experience, and strength to further enhancing the combat recliness of the Army and Navy and strengthening regulation order and military discipline.

The reception participants applauded the greetings message.

We are at an important and crucial stage of development, the USSR minister of defense continued. The 27th party congress occasioned a new surge of political

self-awareness in the people. Urban and rural working people and Soviet Army and Navy servicemen wholeheartedly approve and support the party's plans and are vitally interested in the practical realization of everything outlined by the congress.

Lasting peace is essential for the successful resolution of creative tasks. The Soviet Union displays consistent love of peace, restraint, and constructiveness in conjunction with firmness and principledness and pursues a policy of strengthening world peace and ensuring international security. The new peace initiatives advanced in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok are an important step in implementing this policy. They are aimed at improving the political climate in Asia and the Pacific zone and throughout the world and at removing the threat of nuclear war.

By its very nature imperialism, and U.S. imperialism above all, pursues an aggressive, adventurist policy. It has not abandoned its unrealizable aim of achieving world supremacy, and its rulers still hope for social revenge.

Taking into account the growing danger of war, the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo devote unflagging attention to our country's defense capability and to enhancing the Soviet Armed Forces' combat readiness. The Soviet Army and Navy possess modern arms and military hardware and have well-trained personnel who are selflessly devoted to their people and worthily fulfill their patriotic and international duty.

The party and state do everything to ensure that the Soviet serviceman — soldier and officer — always feels the concern and attention of society while performing his difficult service and that our Army and Navy are a school for fostering civic responsibility, courage, and patriotism.

The contemporary international situation, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov went on to say, is making new, higher demands on the combat readiness of troops and naval forces, which is directly dependent on the level of training of formations, units, and ships and their ability to fulfill the set tasks.

The USSR minister of defense focused the academy graduates' attention on the importance of an active struggle against stagnation, ostentation, and formalism. He pointed to the need to give all possible support to everything new and progressive that is born of practice and verified in reality and to persistently assert enhanced exactingness and a responsible attitude to work in units and on ships.

The strict observance of the requirements of the military oath, of Regulations, and of commanders' orders is a law of Army and Navy life. It is necessary to persistently assert and daily maintain regulation order in all Army and Navy life.

For the purpose of the successful and qualitative resolution of the tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces party political work must be persistently improved. Maximum concreteness in the matter of education is particularly important today. And one of the ways to this involves in-depth knowledge of subordinates, closeness to people, the ability to establish sincere contacts with them, and concern for satisfying them with everything necessary.

In conclusion the USSR minister of defense assured the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government on behalf of all the reception participants that the academy graduates, armed with the 27th party congress decisions, will fulfill their duty in exemplary fashion and do everything to further enhance the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, which are vigilantly guarding the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the security of the motherland and all the socialist community countries.

The reception was addressed by Hero of the Soviet Union Captain N.M. Akramov, graduate of the M.V.Frunze Military Academy; Polish Army Captain Jan Grzyb, graduate of the V.I. Lenin Military-political Academy; and Major General L.N. Ilin, department chief at the Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko Military Academy of Chemical Protection.

The reception was held in an atmosphere of warmth and cordiality.

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ARMED FORCES

INCOMPLETE CONSTRUCTION OF FIRING RANGE DISRUPTS TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 86 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Panyukov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "How the Firing Range Was 'Frozen'; Against Mismanagement and Extravagance"]

[Text] It was a year and a half ago that I became witness to the following incident at a certain training center. The motorized rifle company of a certain regiment traveled over 50 kilometers to the troop firing range of a neighboring unit, where according to the plan it was to work on a routine item of the fire training program. But at the site it became clear that all of the efforts of the motorized riflemen were to be for nought: Subunits of another unit were already using the firing range.

"It's all right," regimental staff officer Major A. Kotov, who came to the practice range together with the company, consoled himself and the others. "In half a year we'll have our own firing range."

And so, later on we found ourselves at the very point where a year ago the training facility which Major Kotov and his fellow servicemen had counted on was to have gone into operation. It must be said that the location for the troop firing ground, a very important facility, was selected well. Because of the roughness of the terrain it was not suited for farming, and it could not suit the fire training needs of the motorized riflemen any better. Though of course, for the moment no one could even think about fire practice, because the firing range was not yet ready. A few section control posts and two field supply points had been set up, and a cable had been laid. And that's about it, except for a few other facilities, construction of which had been postponed. I say postponed because the hope remains that construction will suddenly resume.

Well, what happened? Why had construction of a facility everyone was dreaming about and whose outfitting had been budgeted, been "frozen"? It turns out that when work on the firing range was already going full steam, it suddenly struck the regiment that it did not know where it was going to get the power to run the range. Problems arose, but no one was in a hurry to solve them, and construction began to gradually slow down and stop. At the moment the facility is essentially "frozen." And when did this happen? After over half of the allocated resources had already

been invested in construction. Just a few days before the start of summer combat training.

Enthusiasm for the facility also began to cool, to put it mildly, at higher headquarters. Work at the practice range is proceeding basically by hand. But it would be impossible, for example, to put the multi-ton reinforced concrete roofs into place without a lifting crane. An excavator and a bull-dozer are needed for earth-moving jobs. But the motorized riflemen have none of this, and judging from the reactions of some officials to the evolved situation, nothing will be available in the near future. As an example here is how Colonel G. Petrov, an officer of the higher headquarters, replied to Major Kotov when the latter asked for an excavator and a bulldozer: "I'm not going to give anything to you. It'll soon be time for me to move to a new assignment, and I want all of the equipment to be serviceable when I leave."

Strange logic: keeping equipment serviceable by not using it.

Chiefs responsible for providing construction materials to the facility also assumed a strange position. There are no bricks, concrete slabs, cement or crushed rock.

"All of this is supposed to come to us through centralized supply," said Major Kotov. "But nothing ever comes. They tell us to get it ourselves."

And so the regiment is compelled to get the things it needs on its own, to spend money allocated for equipment purchases to obtain construction materials. Is this really prudent business?

And in the meantime, seeking possibilities for carrying out planned fire training lessons, the motorized riflemen continue to wander from one "foreign" training field to another, burning fuel and expending engine life. Moreover as a rule they are not really welcome at the "foreign" practice ranges. Naturally, under these conditions there can be no discussion of maintaining a smooth rhythm in the training process. Nor can there be hope of much success: Despite all of the effort, the socialist pledges adopted by the regiment's personnel in fire training during the winter training period remained unsatisfied.

Of course, this result is not to the liking of the motorized riflemen. Nor is to the liking of senior chiefs. But expressing a sense of dissatisfaction with a given situation is not enough. Concrete action is needed. And one would think that the first step would be for the higher headquarters to "defrost" its attitude toward a problem of vital importance to the motorized riflemen.

11004

ARMED FORCES

KUNAYEV ATTENDS CENTRAL ASIAN MD MEETING

PM280924 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 86 Second Edition p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin report: "Worthy Reinforcements for the Army"]

[Text] A session of the Military Council of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District has discussed the further improvement of young people's military, patriotic, and international education and their preparation for service in the Armed Forces.

The report delivered by Colonel General V. Lobov, commander of the district forces, and the speeches of Lieutenant General G. Kochkin, member of the district Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate, and others focused attention on the tasks stemming from the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the further improvement of the preparation of young people for military service.

The Military Council session was attended by D. Kunayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, K. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, and other party and soviet officials.

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ARMED FORCES

COLONEL GENERAL BATEKHIN ON COMMANDERS' RELATIONSHIP TO PERSONNEL

Moseow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 86 p 2

[Article by Colonel General of Aviation L. Batekhin, Military Council Member, Chief, Air Force Political Administration, under the rubric "Work Style and the Times": "Properly Structure Relationships With People"]

[Text] In these remarks I would like to discuss that aspect of the restructuring now gathering strength in our social life which is improving the style, nature and, if you wish, spirit of relations between supervisors and subordinates. One of the fundamental demands made toward cadres by the CPSU Program is that relationships with people be structured properly.

First of all it is important that each leader, and in our army conditions this is practically everyone who has people subordinate to him, understand thoroughly that this is namely a program requirement and that arbitrariness and caprice are impermissible. Given all the individuality of character, a leader is obligated to observe the principles which define his conduct and style of work from party positions.

What should be singled out first here? At the 27th CPSU Congress the thought was repeatedly emphasized of the need to take into account constantly the political meaning of management; to promote to leadership positions politically mature workers, and to assess cadres from top to bottom according to their political, professional and moral qualities (and, as you see, political qualities stand first in this formula). We must elevate these political criteria of the leader's personality to a special height. Everyone must raise them "in himself," in his own consciousness. If this elevating is lacking, formalism in work, a loss of self-criticism, disdain for others and other moral distortions take place.

I will give a typical example. More accurately, I will talk about two leaders. For purposes of instruction I will present them in comparison.

At approximately the same time officers V. Vasilyev and N. Tabashnikov were named to high positions. The first I had already known in the capacity of regimental commander. It was remarked of him that Valentin Afanasyevich was always scrupulous in questions of the honor of a leader and tried to correspond the best impressions of a commander and to act strictly in the

spirit of the demands of military regulations. Here I would like to refute one incorrect opinion. This is namely that a leader demonstrates those internal qualities which he possesses, and it is difficult to demand more of a man. It is said that he may raise the level of his knowledge and acquire experience, but that it is necessary to reckon with his character. If he himself is constantly "in the platoon" and gets on others' nerves, he cannot be re-made and will continue to act in the same manner.

No, an officer, both in his character and in everything else, is obligated to discipline himself and be obedient to the requirements of regulations which are presented to him. Some do this out of fear that they will be punished for deviations and that will not be promoted on time. I must say at once that these are poor supports and could collapse at any moment. It is another matter when a man subordinates himself to principles out of conviction, that he is obligated to be thus and only thus, and when he strives for perfection and the ideal.

Valentin Afanasyevich always distinguished himself by precisely purposefulness. And this left an impression on the style of his work and his He breathed, as we say, the same air as relations toward his subordinates. his pilots. In the most tense situation he brought confidence into the frame of mind of the collective. No one could recall that the commander ever lost His subordinates believed in his innovative his head or raised his voice. decisions without proof, but he explained their meaning and saw in this important lessons for them. He strove for a creative atmosphere and an instructive critique of the flights. On exercises the pilots lived in tents in the winter and he lived with them. There was not a pilot in the regiment with whom he would not fly personally. Although he was a strict commander he was also able to be a comrade and willingly accepted an invitation for a cup He believed that in an environment of trust one gets to know a man And he, seemingly, knew everything about his subordinates. Someone better. The personal life of the regiment aptly stated about those such as Vasilyev: commander is the life of the regiment, passed through his heart.

Later I met Vasilyev, already a division commander, at a major exercise, and later, already in the rank of general, he again rose in position. But in the matter in which he interacted with people and in his methods of calm and thoughtful leadership of his subordinates, he always remained the same.

The fate and the results of N. Tabashnikov were different, although he also worked unstintingly. But he was not able to listen to others, consult, rely on the assistance of the party organization and his deputies. He was disdainful of the moral atmosphere in the collective and often broke into crudeness. He respected no one except, it seems, himself. And such a matter as concern about people simply did not exist for him. This was the reason for the mistakes in his work.

Later such negative consequences of this "leadership" by N. Tabashnikov were revealed that it was necessary to bring him to strict party accountability and remove him from his position. I think that the main reason for the professional and human drama surrounding this commander was that at some stage

the same political criteria in his self-assessments and in his views about his position and duty flagged.

These criteria must literally permeate the style of the leader. They stem from the system of our Soviet and socialist relations between the leader and his subordinates. This is what they are based on and this is what each individual must constantly recall. This is also why we say that political maturity is that fund in the spirit which leaves no place for shallow feelings and convictions, and which makes relations between the leader and his subordinates socially mature. To root out of life where they exist callousness, indifference to the needs and requests of people, haughtiness and alienation is an indispensable requirement! And, naturally, here already arise tasks both for the self-indoctrination of cadres and for indoctrination work by commanders, political organs and party organizations. In this effort it is fundamentally important to raise the authority of demanding leaders who are able to combine high regulatory demands toward their subordinates with concern about them.

Needless to say, questions of relationships cover an extremely broad spectrum. Therefore, I will discuss only a few. I would still like to share this one thing — the ability not to see this problem in a narrow way. To structure relationships with people properly is not only to structure personal contact. Relationships also take place indirectly. To fail to understand this means to let slip from view important aspects of the work of strengthening military discipline and adherence to regulations.

Let us say that the commander or chief is supposed to regularly receive visitors to discuss personal questions, and he does not do so. He does not take an interest in the quality of food in the mess hall. He never displays an interest in how the officers live or what problems they have in their domestic affairs. Of course, all of this already in and of itself weakens those important "threads of closeness." And is it truly not harmful when aviators have to wait around for hours until transport arrives to take them to the airfield? Or when officers wait a long time for an announced meeting, and then are told that the meeting will not take place?

I came across such facts recently in one of the regiments. To a large extent Officer Yu. Savchuk was at fault. People complained repeatedly about the unintelligible organization of flights and about various shortcomings in regimental life, but no one listened to them. The feeling of alienation became aggravated, the moral atmosphere in the collective became heated and disgust arose in the capabilities of certain communist leaders to handle matters competently. Consequently, in order to structure relationships with people correctly and strengthen one-man command, it is very important to be able to see the individual and his frame of mind in all of our organizational work.

Today, no matter on what plane we examine the problem of relationships, we immediately touch upon the question of social justice. This is a question of a fundamental nature, because it almost always affects the interests of specific people who have their joys and views about life and its real and imaginary values. The leader must confirm in the consciousness of his

subordinates, most of all by personal example, the true values. He must do this always, under any circumstances. Otherwise our words about justice will remain fruitless and trust in it will be destroyed. And we cannot, we do not have the right, to permit this.

It is always necessary to remember about the unity of word and deed, under the most ordinary circumstances: whether we are talking about distributing housing, creating comfortable living in the barracks, sending to the cadre organ in a timely manner the views about an officer whose time for promotion is approaching, or in selecting candidates to attend an academy. It is necessary to see social justice not "in general," but in this aspect, grounded in specific situations and in specific concern about people. This is also a very important aspect of the relationships between a leader and his subordinates.

Not so long ago a group of generals and officers from the VVS [Air Force] central apparatus worked in one of the remote garrisons, "difficult" with respect to everyday life. Twenty days was all that was needed to do that which had been talked about for years in the garrison as insoluble tasks. They talked, but very little was done to change the situation for the better. By various references they justified their own inertness, lack of desire to improve their methods, break with their customary and comfortable rut of "general" leadership and restore the unity between the words said about a attitude toward people and their deeds. This was characteristic of Major General of Aviation A. Gopko, who is responsible for rear services support. And what happened? Warm linen and sheets, which had been "lost" in the supply warehouses were found; the commission detected entire deposits of fur clothing. The temperature in the barracks was raised. The bath and laundry facility began to work smoothly. The facilities were completely fitted out with furniture and order was brought to the dining hall. In short, life was brought to normal. And this was done without any additional expenses.

It is good, of course, that the comrades came from the center and everything was changed for the better. But, after all, someone will not come from Moscow under any pretext and solve every question. This is the reason that the commander, political organ, various services and the party organization exist; in order to solve all questions fully and at a high level, as the party requires today. And the demands upon this will be most severe.

Finally, I believe it is necessary to discuss relationships between the communist leader and the party organization. There are facts indicating that some try to place themselves in a special position. Such a position was occupied by Colonel S. Sysoyev, the political officer, when at the party electoral meeting one of the communists criticized, and with complete justification, formalism in the organization of Marxist-Leninist training of the unit's officers. Sysoyev immediately thereafter removed the portrait of this officer from the board of honor and began to seek out reasons to punish him. I will say briefly that after the intervention of the VVS Political Administration Sysoyev received party punishment and was demoted in position.

Unfortunately, other facts of this nature are seen. Let us say that even a hint of some omissions was heard at a party meeting. The leader considers himself wounded and at times actions taken in response clearly do not represent him well. On the other hand, his party comrades and professional subordinates, seeing this reaction shift, if it can be so said, to professional relationships in party life as well. Shortcomings are ignored and essentially the collective becomes reconciled to the seeming existence of two disciplines in the party organization — for some and for others. The very essence of party relations is distorted. Here there is no possibility of a truly Bolshevik atmosphere in the party organization. And we recall how at the 27th CPSU Congress it was emphasized that the great traditions of Bolshevik and party comradeship must be developed and consolidated.

Life itself continuously emphasizes that the leader must be vitally interested in the disclosure of shortcomings, collective experience, and principled party identity of ideas and straight forwardness. This is his strength, his buttress and his assistance, and in the event that negative phenomena and personal errors loom large it is his saving warning.

For the commander or supervisor to structure relations with people properly means to follow unwaveringly the program requirements of the party and military regulations, and to implement his sole-command on a strict party basis. This is the guarantee of the activation of energy of the personnel, the strengthening of military discipline and the improvement of combat readiness.

ARMED FORCES

EDITOR NOTES SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SOLDIERS' LETTERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 86 p 2

[Article by Col A. Khorev; under the rubric "Military Correspondent's Column": Different Letters Are Written"]

[Text] Reading this phrase in a headline, lovers of poetry of course immediately recall the well-known poem by Konstantin Simonov:

Different letters are written: Tearful, painful, Sometimes beautiful, More often useless....

We will discuss different kinds of letters, but unfortunately not at all beautiful letters, written and sent by certain soldiers to relatives and friends. As it would happen, some of these letters wound up in our editor's office.

The first two were sent to us by the mother of soldier Viktor U., serving in the Moscow Antiaircraft District. As a mother, she naturally turned her attention mainly to elements of domestic disorder noted in letters from her son: It's not very homey in the barracks and the medical station, it's dirty in the dining hall, and so on. We informed the unit command of these deficiencies, and we hope that steps will be taken.

In his letters the soldier also complains of "difficulties" he encounters such as washing floors in the barracks. He calls this "tiresome" work. I am not about to argue that washing floors is an attractive pursuit. But life has never consisted of pleasures alone. And this is all the more true of military service. Privates and seamen have been in a self-service situation since time immemorial. That is something that goes along with a military life, a life in the field. And no repeal of self-service is envisioned in the foreseeable future in the army and the navy. I think that Viktor U. complained of such things out of immaturity, and that with time his attitude toward such work will change, and that he will laugh later on at his complaints. As they say, things will turn out all right in the end.

But there is one thing in the soldier's letters that cannot be attributed to immaturity: As we know, even ignorance of the law does not relieve a

person of responsibility for its violation. And a soldier cannot but know of his sacred responsibility-being vigilant, and strictly keeping military and state secrets. After all, he took the military oath, and he solemnly vowed to observe it. And yet Viktor U.'s letter contains information about the number of personnel in the subunit in which he serves, and about the planned transfers of young soldiers in this subunit: "Yesterday I heard it rumored that soon we, the young soldiers, will be transferred to training at" He goes on to name the geographical location.

This scandalous carelessness of the young soldier compels us to think that some areas in the work of instilling vigilance are lacking in the subunit in which he serves. It is hard to believe that no discussions had ever been carried out in the subunit on this always-important topic. But as we know, general discussions help little. Young soldiers need to have it explained concretely to them exactly what information of a military nature should not be revealed, and what the punishment is for revealing military and state secrets.

Unfortunately, such concreteness in instilling vigilance is lacking in many subunits. As an example every Lenin Room possesses visual agitation and popular brochures on this topic. One rarely encounters a special discussion in company and battalion plans for political indoctrination on what can and what cannot be communicated about military service in letters written by soldiers. It would hardly be too much to ask for such discussion.

In the same way that it would not be too much to talk with young soldiers about the art of correspondence in general. Unfortunately, not all have achieved wisdom in these matters.

Recently a certain unit received a letter from the Voroshilovgrad Higher Military Aviation Navigator School imeni Proletariat Donbassa. It was not addressed on the envelope to any particular individual, and the mailman, deciding that this was a business letter, brought it to headquarters. They opened it and read it, and raised their arms in dismay. This letter turned out to be from a cadet to one of his former schoolmates. But in its form and in its content it offered nothing to believe that it was from a cultured person, such as one would expect of a cadet in a higher military school. The letter was abundant with coarse, even censorable language. Its tone was one of drunkenness and gluttony. "And recently," the cadet writes, calling himself Erik, "I managed to skip out on a bogus pass...." (This obviously means that the author had gone AWOL on a forged pass). What sort of jargon is this? And what was there to boast about?

Reading the letter, one surmises that the author very much wants to portray himself as being worse than he actually is. This could have been treated as a private matter, were it not for one insidious circumstance: People sometimes judge all servicemen by the deeds of individuals.

No, it would not at all be too much to talk with the soldiers about the art of correspondence in general and about the norms of vigilance in such correspondence in particular.

11004

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

WIRING POLARITY FAILURE FOILS INTERCEPT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 86 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Tsvetov, Red Banner Volga Military District: "A Forced Landing"; "Only One Episode"]

[Text] This happened during difficult aerial combat. The target would not stay on the crosshairs of the electronic sight, and it strayed away. Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Vetoshkin could sense from everything that he was doing simulated combat with an experienced adversary who played tricks, maneuvered artfully and evaded the blows. It took a great deal of effort to keep the target trace in the sighting ring, and Vetoshkin had to put all of his effort into it. Moreover this was a check-out flight for the senior lieutenant, and its results would determine whether or not he would be allowed to go on to more-interesting assignments of greater complexity.

Vladimir noticed that his adversary's airplane began to turn away, banking steeply as it dropped. "He's going to try to get away by diving," he reacted mentally. "And the target is most vulnerable at the low point of its trajectory." The senior lieutenant's hands automatically did what was required of this situation. Vetoshkin delayed for an instant, waiting for the most advantageous position for the attack. "Now!" he finally allowed himself to act.

But suddenly the screen of the radar sight dimmed rapidly, and soon it went out altogether. The pilot's eyes raced over the instruments: everything seemed to be in order.

In the next instant Vladimir turned away from the target, and at that moment he noticed that all of the instruments powered by the onboard electric power system were out.

Vetoshkin pressed the radio button to report what happened to the command post, but instead of a voice he heard a weak, gradually diminishing crackling in his earphones. This meant that something happened with the electric power supply.

The pilot was now essentially blind in the air, and he was unable to find any landmarks. There was of course the extreme solution--Vladimir could activate his catapult chair. But the land below was densely populated.

And there was something else that kept him from making such a decision-he had to try to save the expensive equipment entrusted to him.

No, he had to hold on. Vetoshkin recalled his training in emergency flight situations. He had practiced responding to a similar situation once before. Vladimir adopted a decision that required considerable endurance, self-control and high occupational proficiency of him. He assumed a convenient altitude and began circling, waiting for a "leader"--an airplane which would lead him back to the airfield and help him land. Vetoshkin was certain that the command post was disturbed by his silence, and that they were monitoring his flight. He was not wrong.

Soon Vladimir spied his rescuer. The leader airplane signaled to follow.

The landing approach was very complex because the flaps would not deploy. Nonetheless Vladimir managed to descend successfully and land safely.

The causes of the incident were meticulously analyzed at the airfield. It was found that specialists of the technical maintenance unit (TECh) made a mistake during repairs on the airplane, as a result of which the polarity of the cables was reversed.

Yes, the carelessness and personal lack of discipline of the specialists could have resulted in something that could not be undone. But owing to the pilot's endurance and resourcefulness, the airplane was saved.

Senior Lieutenant Vetoshkin was awarded the Order of the Red Star for competent actions in an emergency and for displaying bravery and valor during it.

11004

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

DISCUSSION OF COMPUTER TRAINING IN PVO UNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 86 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Timchenko, Red Banner Central Asian Military District, under the rubric "Officer Training: "At the Computer Panel"]

1-12-60

[Text] I remember Lieutenant Colonel N. Ivanov seated at the computer control panel. His eyes continuously tracked the instruments and the fingers of his hands flew lightly across the keyboard. He reminded me of a musician who had mastered his instrument to the most minute detail. And the next time I heard a remark which he made to one young officer: "In order for electronic equipment to operate flawlessly it is important not only to be able to operate the computer, but also to know its mechanism and condition thoroughly."

He himself is a master of his military skill. His outstanding knowledge of electronic equipment and capable work on it enables him to use his weapon with maximum effectiveness. Once, for example, the situation was that Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov had some few seconds to make the decision to launch a missile. His mastery of the computer came to his rescue. The missile launch was accurate and timely.

He is not the only person in the unit with such high professional training. The majority of the officers are high-class specialists and masters, including on computers. Primarily commanders' training enables this: planned lessons, practice drills and tactical exercises. However, it is necessary to say that all the officers without exception are obligated to study the planned topics conscientiously and to perfect their practical skills on the computer. Moreover, in addition to that which is in the military training program it is necessary to work and train more independently and find additional time for this. This is what is done by officers N. Ivanov, A. Bryukhovetskiy and others. They work daily on the computer according to individual plans. In particular, many of them along with their subordinates take part regularly in timed work.

However, some officers are satisfied thus far with acquiring merely general concepts about the computer. Take, for example, Major Ye. Kutsko. He appears in the computer booth only before record test firing, in order to "brush up" his knowledge on this equipment and not seem entirely unprepared to the inspectors. But the inspection passes and Major Kutsko can no longer be seen

in the booth. How does he explain this attitude toward training? By stating that work on the computer is not envisioned by his direct professional duties. This is correct. However, in combat Major Kutsko may have to replace another officer who has been knocked out of action and sit at the computer panel. And in order to feel confident of himself there it is necessary today, during daily military training, to master persistently and purposefully computers and other modern equipment. It is well known that this equipment is continuously being modernized. But equipment does not engage in combat by itself. A mind and hands, as the saying goes, need to be added to it. Therefore, it is necessary to be strict with those who push it aside, both along the commander's and the party line. the party line. And this is not being done. instance here in which anyone was truly pur I cannot an punished unconscientiousness in the study of computer equipment.

Here is another problem. The electronic equipment located in the unit does not have its own training simulators. The young specialists must master their skills on the equipment directly. And this is not so simple. First, it is used in military work and is not always free for training. Second, there is a risk that it will be knocked out of action. Training is training. For this simulators are more convenient.

The subordinates of Lieutenant Colonel N. Ivanov decided to create simulators, if only to accomplish the initial operations in working on the computer. Major A. Bryukhovetskiy, a master of his military skill, demonstrated much energy and good inventiveness here. The subordinates of Lieutenant Colonel A. Koluzayev are making their own contribution as well. They are creating a simulator for the training of computer operators. However, they and others are meeting with great difficulties. For example, they are confronted with a shortage of parts and various assembly materials. It is true that after the intervention of officers from the district missile forces and artillery administration assistance to the rationalizers became more tangible. same it is inadequate. The higher headquarters should become involved in this matter. It should, in particular, assist in the retooling of the training center, where the soldiers will master the techniques of work on the computer and gain an understanding of the mechanical arrangement of this complex apparatus.

Every officer must work with the computers so that the capabilities contained in this machinery can be maximized for improving the quality of military training and the effective use of weapons.

OBITUARY: COL GEN AVN V. I. YEZHKOV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 86 p 4

[Obituary signed by A. N. Yefimov, L. L. Batekhin, B. F. Korolkov, V. Ye. Pankin, V. V. Reshetnikov, A. F. Borsuk, G. U. Dolnikov, V. Z. Skubilin, N. G. Shishkov, A. N. Zakrevskiy, A. N. Volkov, P. I. Belonozhko, N. M. Skomorokhov, G. P. Skorikov, I. D. Gaydayenko, I. F. Modyayev, Yu. V. Simakhin and A. M. Tikhomirov]

[Text] Lt Gen Avn (Ret) Vladimir Ivanovich Yezhkov, a Great Patriotic War participant and Honored Military Pilot of the USSR who dedicated all his conscious life to service to the socialist homeland and the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1946, passed away.

Yezhkov was born in 1921 in the village of Vazyan, Vadskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast. He volunteered for military flight school in August 1940. From 1943 until the end of the Great Patriotic War he took part in combat actions by aviation of the Northern and Western air defense fronts. Yezhkov displayed high aerial schooling, courage and valor in battles against the fascist invaders.

After the war Yezhkov completed the Air Academy and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, then held a number of important positions among the troops and on the central staff of the Air Forces. He gave all his effort, energy, knowledge, and combat and life experience to the cause of improving combat readiness of air units [chast and soyedineniye].

The Communist Party and Soviet state highly esteemed Yezhkov's services to the Motherland, decorating him with the Order of October Revolution, two orders of Red Banner, the Order of Patriotic War 1st Class, two orders of Red Star, the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class, and many medals.

The bright memory of Vladimir Ivanovich Yezhkov, true son of the Communist Party and Soviet people, will remain forever in our hearts.

6904

KRASNAYA ZVESDA: U.S. SUBS MAKE 'PROVOCATIVE' NORTH POLE VISIT

PM281304 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 86 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Provocative Show"]

[Text] Washington, 26 May--The United States has staged another provocative show of naval might--this time in the Arctic. According to a Navy Department report, on 6 May this year three U.S. nuclear hunter-killer submarines surfaced at the North Pole. The report was issued on the submarines' return to their home ports.

The aim of the voyage, as the Pentagon put it, was to "verify the combat readiness of the submarine fleet in Arctic conditions." UPI draws attention to the fact that the official report contained virtually no information about what tasks the crews were set during the operation.

/8309

CSO: 1812/211

NARRATIVE ON SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 86, p 1

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Timoshchuk of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, under the "Commanders' Training" rubric: "In the Assault Landing Zone"]

[Text] Tense expectation reigns in the zone of forthcoming naval assault landings. After deploying his surface forces, the "enemy" secretly prepared for an attack from ships approaching with naval infantry on board.

The field headquarters of a Guards division of missile boats under the command of Guards Captain 3rd Rank S. Korolev carefully studies the possibilities for ensuring the safety of the assault. Prereconnaissance of the situation is necessary. A boat is sent our ahead from the division under the command of Guards Captain 3rd Rank L. Puzyrevsky.

As soon as the missile boat entered the circle plotted on the plotting board in dark blue, "enemy" radar stations came to life.

The situation becomes more strained. However, in reality, the men on the boat are at the bulkhead, and the exercise is played out with the use of a system of shore classrooms and onboard equipment. Officers from division headquarters work along with the ship's battle teams while improving command experience.

While the boat commander and his crew are busy carrying out the assigned mission, staff officers develop the most effective variant for the destruction of the detected grouping.

Now the enemy uses deceptive maneuvers and combined interference. And it is possible to imitate an attempt to deliver a strike against the missile boat. Any training program may be assigned. The boat crew often use frontline experience.

Thus, the plan recently decided on for the "enemy's" destruction is based on procedures for conducting reconnaissance and assault security, which the Pacific Ocean boat crew used in the war years. Of course, much has changed since then: arms, tactics.... Yet, the frontline sailors' artistic spirit, courage and boldness in drawing up solutions merit imitation to this day. Twenty men in the unit were awarded the order of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The boat commander, Guards Captain 3rd Rank Puzyrevsky, boldly and decisively began the surprise attack against the most dangerous target. He follows the detected ships, one of which used its weapons against the boat.

The division commander sees much that is instructive in the situation which has developed as well as in the stop frame and stops the episode. He proposes that the staff officers evaluate the setting, analyze the actions of the boat commander and prepare recommendations for the exercise leader and the boat commander for the subsequent conduct of battle.

"I consider it expedient to proceed in the following manner..." reports Guards Captain 3rd Rank S. Michurin.

Other flagship specialists express their own suggestions. But now the division commander once again puts the exercise "picture" in motion. All can see in practice the true value of their suggestions.

The general main line of further actions becomes visible in the stream of opinions" to take advantage of the fact that the "enemy" drew off part of his forces to pursue the boat and for a detachment to attack him from the flank.

The staff officers organize the practical realization of the outlined plan, each according to his own profile, while imparting particular value to accurate cooperation.

The boats have their own concerns. Right now the main one is to quickly go over to the attack and accurately engage the target.

The deciding moment of the training battle arrives. Even though many targets are only stimulated now, no one feels conventionality. After all, this is where one's own inaccuracies are felt even more sharply: it is always possible to stop and return to the start or to individual combat episodes.

The boat division goes into battle at a prearranged signal. Looking at the advance of the swift boats, you become convinced that their capabilities in modern naval combat are as great as ever. Small, maneuverable, well-protected and with formidable weapons on board, they do not allow the "enemy" to recover from their sudden blows. They increase the tempo of battle and prevent ships from approaching the area where the naval assault landing is already proceeding at full speed.

It would seem from all indices that the result of the exercise would satisfy the boat sailors. However, during the analysis the exercise leader concentrated the officers' attention on reserves not yet used. It seems that he was able to see and expose them. This means that they will be taught during the preparation for the forthcoming exercises in the commanders' training system.

13109/12951 CSO: 1801/190 DOSAAF

UKSSR DOSAAF TASKS DISCUSSED BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

AU111004 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 29 Apr 86 p 3

[Text] The part contributed by the Ukraine's defense society in consolidating the country's defensive capability and in the preparation of the working people for the defense of the socialist homeland is significant. Its tasks stemming from the 27th CPSU Congress decisions were discussed at the sixth plenum of the Ukrainian DOSAAF Central Committee, which was held in Kiev recently. Aviation Colonel General A.D. Korotchenko, the society's Central Committee chairman, delivered a report.

While doing justice to the achievements, the plenum participants quite frankly spoke about shortcomings in the activity of committees and organizations. In some of them, concrete work has been substituted by talk about the need for improvements and for many decisions, as well as the lack of control over their implementation. A number of collectives are slow in overcoming inertness, the lack of initiative, paper work, session fuss, and the practice of embroidering the state of affairs. This was characteristic of Vinnitsa, Zakarpatskaya, Kiev, and Odessa Oblast organization.

In the decision adopted, measures were determined for further improving society's work, for developing and perfecting its forms and methods, and for boosting in committees and organizations an atmosphere of creativity, adherence to principles, exactingness, and irreconcilability to shortcomings.

Participating in the plenum proceedings were responsible functionaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, as well as of a number of the republic's ministries and departments.

/8309

CSO: 1812/211

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

DISCUSSION OF ENTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY SCHOOLS

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 86 p 4

[Article: "Rules for Acceptance in Higher Military Educational Institutions"]

[Text] Warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany], first-term and extended-term military personnel, military construction personnel, civilian youths, reservists [voyennoobyazannyye] from among first-term military personnel released to the reserve, and graduates of Suvorov military schools, the Nakhimov Naval School and the Moscow Military Music School with a completed secondary (secondary specialized) education, fit from a health standpoint with consideration of psychological data and physical preparedness for training in military educational institutions, and who successfully pass entrance exams in general educational subjects are being accepted in Ministry of Defense higher military educational institutions.

Warrant officers are accepted at the expiration of two years of service in warrant officer positions or in officer positions; extended-term personnel are accepted at the expiration of two years of extended-term service; and reservists are accepted from among extended-term military personnel released to the reserve who are no older than 23 years of age. First-term military personnel are accepted regardless of their military specialty or term of service (except for higher military-political schools, which accept military personnel who have served at least one year), and civilian youth are accepted in the ages of from 17 to 21.

First-term military personnel and civilian youths are accepted in higher military-political schools on the recommendation of political bodies of the Soviet Army and Navy or of CPSU (Komsomol) raykoms (gorkoms) respectively.

Secondary military schools accept the same persons as do higher military educational institutions (except warrant officers).

The age of those entering school is determined as of 31 December, and term of service is determined as of 1 September of the year of entry.

Warrant officers and first-term and extended-term military personnel who wish to enter military educational institutions submit an application through channels to the military unit commander prior to 1 May; civilian youths and reservists submit a request to the rayon (city) military commissariat at their place of residence prior to 1 June of the year of entry.

The military person's application gives military rank, last name, first name, patronymic, position held, year and month of birth, education, and the name of the military educational institution (faculty, specialty) which he wishes to enter. Attached to the application are copies of documents on education, party (for CPSU members and candidate members) or Komsomol (for Komsomol members) performance appraisal, three certified photos (without headgear, 4.5 x 6 cm in size), performance appraisal, autobiography, and record of service card. An original document on education is submitted to the acceptance commission on arrival at its work location.

The request by a civilian youth (or reservist) gives last name, first name and patronymic, year and month of birth, home address, and name of military educational institution (faculty) the person desires to enter. Attached to the request is an autobiography, performance appraisal from the place of work or study in the "Rules of Acceptance" format, a party (for CPSU members) or Komsomol (for Komsomol members) performance appraisal, copy of a document on secondary education (pupils of secondary schools submit a certificate [spravka] on current progress), and three photos (without headgear, 4.5 x 6 cm in size).

A passport, record of service or certificate of registration and an original document on secondary education are submitted on arrival by the candidate to the acceptance commission of an educational institution.

Candidates entering military educational institutions undergo a professional selection, including an evaluation of social-political activity and moral traits, and an evaluation of the state of health with consideration of psychological data, physical preparedness and general educational preparation.

The following are enrolled without a test of knowledge of general educational subjects on condition that they conform to all other demands of professional selection: Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor; military personnel and reservists decorated with USSR orders and medals ("Valor," Ushakov, "Combat Merit," Nakhimov) for distinction in combat actions in defense of the USSR and in performing international duty; graduates of Suvorov military schools and the Nakhimov Naval School are accepted in military schools and military universities; graduates of the Moscow Military Music School are accepted in the military bandmaster faculty of the Moscow State Conservatory imeni P. I. Chaykovskiy; persons who have completed secondary schools with a gold medal or secondary specialized educational institutions with an honors diploma are accepted in military aviation-technical schools. In addition, persons who completed the first or subsequent courses of civilian universities in specialties corresponding to the profile of a given military educational institution and who meet the other demands of professional

selection may be enrolled in the first course in higher and secondary military schools and military institutes without a test of knowledge in general educational subjects after an appropriate interview.

Military personnel who have displayed high moral-combat qualities in defense of the USSR and in performance of international duty; first-term and extended-term military personnel who are outstanding in combat and political training and have been announced as such in a military unit order; and candidates who completed educational institutions with a gold medal or an honors diploma and received a grade of five in an entrance exam for the profiling discipline are accepted without competition on the basis of a professional selection on obtaining positive marks in general educational subjects.

Candidates are enrolled on the basis of competition for places which remain after enrollment of persons who have the right of entry without entrance exams and without competition. The social-political activity, moral traits, state of health with consideration of psychological data, and level of physical preparedness and general educational preparation are considered in conducting the competition.

Acceptance commissions of military educational institutions perform the work of professional selection of candidates from 10 through 30 July. The work time of traveling acceptance commissions is from 5 through 25 June, and that of republic acceptance commissions is from 5 through 25 July.

Candidates are sent to the work locations of acceptance commissions by military unit commanders and by rayon (city) military commissariats.

All candidates who have arrived in military educational institutions are provided with free dormitory (barracks), training aids and literature, and candidates from among first-term military personnel and civilian youths additionally are given free meals based on the established norm.

Detailed information on military educational institutions and on rules of acceptance can be obtained in military unit headquarters or in military commissariats.

Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni Mar Avn V. A. Sudets (355021, city of Stavropol, ulitsa Lenina, 320).

Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Leninist Komsomol (250003, city of Chernigov, Chernigovskoye VVAUL [Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots]).

Term of training: 4 years.

Samarkand Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School imeni UzSSR Supreme Soviet (703056, city of Samarkand, 56, Uzbek SSR);

Ussuriysk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School (692521, city of Ussuriysk, 21, Maritime Kray).

Term of training: in engineering schools--5 years; in command schools--4 years.

6904

TRAINING OF YOUNG OFFICERS FOR FIELD EXERCISES CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 86 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Central Asian Military District: "In Hopes of Being Prompted: Thoughts on the Results of Winter Studies"]

[Text] The following happened while I was visiting a battalion live-fire tactical exercise during testing: In the heat of battle the exercise leader ordered the battalion commander over the radio to report to him. Thus, Major P. Zaytsev was required temporarily to give up command and control of the battalion. Instead, the exercise leader gave orders to the sub-units. When the inspector remarked that that was not to be done, the exercise leader objected:

"The battalion commander required assistance. And I wanted to render it more quickly \dots "

The question arises: "Is such assistance necessary? After all, the regiment commander simply replaced his subordinate and did not give him the opportunity to seek a way out of the difficult situation himself. This and other episodes which I witnessed during inspection of the "N" tank regiment convinced me that it had become customary there for senior officers to exercise excessive tutelage of junior officers.

What happened in the battalion I mentioned above? It happened that Major Zaytsev assigned the mission to his reserve imprecisely and, therefore did not possess accurate information about the "enemy." As a result, at the necessary moment the reserve was not in action and was not able to influence the course of combat. This happened because the battalion commander relied upon the regiment commander for everything.

Unfortunately, I have observed such things not only in the battalion commanded by Major Zaytsev. As Colonel V. Bondarenko, the senior officer in the Ground Forces Main Military Training Administration, who was working in those days in the regiment, noted, some subunit commanders were reconciled to the fact that they received continuous tutelage and their attitude toward improving their knowledge and skills lacked the necessary fervor. Their personal indices also convinced one of this. Among those who lagged in the key discipline of

military training were, for example, senior lieutenants S. Martynskiy, Yu. Magay, S. Kodelyuk and lieutenants V. Bobrovskiy and A. Ponamarev.

At the same time the large unit headquarters has documents which indicate that shortcomings in officer training were also previously noted in the "N" tank regiment. However, there was nothing beyond a statement of the fact. In any case, no confirmation of the fact that measures were taken to eliminate the shortcomings could be found.

Let us return to the exercise. It became clear that not only the officers of the battalion commanded by Major Zaytsev were under the tutelage of the senior commanders. The exercise leader himself was deprived of independence. The senior commanders thought about everything which concerned preparation of the training ground. It is true that the regiment commander was going to make an attempt at least to visit the area of the forthcoming exercise before it began. However, this was not even done. An order came from the division headquarters not to interfere. It said they could get along on the training ground without him.

And truly, the regimental commander did not yet have a clear concept of the forthcoming training battle, and on the training ground the target ranges were already covered under the leadership of officers from higher headquarters.

Was there any reason after this to be surprised, for example, by this episode. According to the exercise plan the battalion commanded by Major Zaytsev was to repulse an "enemy" counterattack. However, at the line designated for working out this question the target field did not function. The fact is that back during the preparations for the exercise some of the equipment necessary for putting the target field into operation had become inoperable. Necessary spare parts were not at hand. It was decided to replace them by hand-made parts. They did not work.

This should be expected where commanders still have not refrained from the habit of replacing their subordinates. But before summing up, I would like to direct attention to one more lesson from that inspection. I informed Colonel R. Gusakov, the senior officer of the District Military Training Administration, who was handling questions of material and technical support for the training process, about the incident which took place in the live-fire exercise. This is what he said:

"It is true that we sometimes must replace the exercise leaders when preparing the target ranges. The fact is that in some places the necessary attention is not paid to training platoon, company and battalion commanders in the rules for operation of range equipment. Frequently we see instances experienced officers are unable to deploy the training equipment set on And this is not surprising. tactical field or use it correctly. They are automated devices with remote control and are not simple. information systems. It is necessary to study them thoroughly, which is not done during the process of commander's training. Frequently instances are found when young officers, and even more experienced ones, do not know the main provisions of the guidance documents for service of training centers, and during exercises do not pay attention to warning signs, indicators and signals. Of course the fact that necessary attention is not given in military schools to training future commanders in the practice of conducting exercises, operating range equipment and studying documents on the basis of which preparation of company and battalion live-fire exercises are conducted also has its effect. This deficiency should be corrected as soon as possible.

"As for the assistance which senior commanders render to the exercise leader, and he in turn to the battalion commander, this can be termed a dubious service. After all, this is what happens. Having not trained the battalion commander adequately, the regimental commander virtually removes him from commanding his battalion and takes command himself. This is no longer assistance, but unwarranted tutelage.

"And could the shortcomings be prevented in some other way? At the division headquarters I was familiarized with the plan for a meeting which took place back in January with the battalion commanders and their deputies. The officers of the regiment which we are discussing demonstrated poor results at that time. It was necessary for the large unit staff to take under his control their professional training and assist individually those who required assistance.

"However, nothing of this ever took place. Moreover, the officers were not even asked about their poor individual training. For example, Captain G. Bakanov, chief of staff of the battalion commanded by Major Zaytsev, obtained unsatisfactory marks in firing training and tank driving at this meeting. But this fact the regiment simply "did not notice," and to this day the portrait of the lagging officer graces the stand devoted to the leaders of competition. There is nothing surprising in the fact that in the concluding exercise Captain Bakanov handled his duties in far from the best possible manner.

Yes, the inspection gave food for thought. Now everything will depend on how they react to its results in each subunit, each headquarters and each party and komsomol organization, and what measures will be taken to eliminate the shortcomings as soon as possible.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

BRIEFS

TULA ENGINEERING SCHOOL COMPUTERS--The Tula Higher Artillery Engineering School imeni Tula Proletariat is actively searching for ways to improve the training process. In particular, a set of control assignments has been developed here for the purpose of giving future military engineers skills in studying the modes in which technical devices function. Like many other assignments, including those involving diploma design work, cadets perform them using computers. This permits freeing a considerable part of training time and using it for improving the future officers' practical skills. [By Lt Col S. Mazurkevich] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 86 p 2] 6904

1801/157

MILITARY HISTORY

ARMY GEN GETMAN REVIEWS VOLUME ON LESSONS OF WW II

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 86 pp 88-92

[Review by General of the Army and Hero of the Soviet Union A. Getman, of book: "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna: Itogi i uroki" [The Second World War: Results and Lessons], collective authorship, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1985, 447 pages, 28 tables, illustrations, 8 pages of colored maps]

[Text] This past year has seen a real abundance of historiographical works devoted to the Soviet people's heroic struggle against the German Fascist invaders and to the entire Second World War. A major work entitled "The Second World War. Results and Lessons" that was prepared by Soviet scholars is one such important work.

This relatively small volume of complex scientific research recounts the important historical event that can truly be called the most important tragedy of the 20th Century -- the Second World War. It was the most fierce and bloody war mankind has ever known. Sixty-one countries were pulled into the war and more than 50 million human lives were lost in six long years. Thousands of cities and villages were reduced to ruins and ashes. A significant part of the book covers the post-war period when a radical change in the correlation of forces occurred in favor of socialism and the struggle for preserving peace and averting nuclear war became the paramount problem of the times.

I belong to the generation of people who not only witnessed how the ruling circles of the fascist governments of Germany and Italy, as well as militaristic Japan, were aroused and the all-absorbing flame of the Second World War was kindled. We also took an active part in putting that flame out until we achieved total and final victory over these violent enemies of humanity. Naturally, as a participant and an eye-witness to many historical events associated with the past war, the author of these lines was especially attentive in studying the contents of the book under review and the facts and conclusions contained in that book.

As we know, one has to really know the reasons that gave rise to a historical phenomenon in order to understand its essence. What were the reasons for the Second World War? The book is very convincing in giving the answer to this question. The book's first section, entitled "The Outbreak and Course of the War", has six chapters and convincingly narrates and analyzes the reasons for

the war breaking out and the economic and political factors which caused it. By getting acquainted with these facts, the reader becomes convinced that the reasons for the war are contained in the very nature of imperialism, its aggressiveness and the contradictions peculiar to it and in the policy that imperialist states conducted on the eve of the war.

The Second World War was started by the very system of capitalism which made Nazi Germany and a number of other fascist states its primary strike force. During a speech dedicated to the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's victory in the Great Patriotic War Comrade M. S. Gorbachev indicated that this war "was conceived long before the first battles were started on European fields and oceanic expanses. Its ominous shadow threatened mankind when some politicians could not and others would not prevent Hitlerism's assumption of power. We now know better and more clearly than we did then about who and how the fascist ruling cabal was assisted in arming itself, developing the potential for aggression and preparing for its military adventurism."

The work that is being reviewed is yet another reliable source for broadening our knowledge about how Hitleristic Fascism was reared and nurtured, who directly or indirectly encouraged and kindled its aspirations for world dominance and who was among its closest allies.

After carrying out the fascist revolution in Germany, the Nazis leaders, headed by Hitler, planned to seize European territory and subordinate vast lands on other continents. The aggressive fascist plans and the furious arms race that they started created a dire threat not only to neighboring countries, but to the world as a whole. Hitlerite Germany successfully carried out its military preparations. The scale and speed in the growth of its military economy and armed forces are shown by data contained in the book. "Whereas in 1934 Germany produced 840 airplanes, it produced 4733 in 1936. Military production increased by a factor of 22 from 1934 to 1940. Germany had 29 divisions in 1935 and by fall of 1939 it already had 102. In seven pre-war years the total number of men in the Wehrmacht rose from 105,000 to 4.6 million."

Japan and Italy also expanded their military potential. In the early 40's they carried out an entire series of armed provocation against sovereign states and created a hotbed of war. And this was to a great extent facilitated by the English, French and U.S. ruling circles' policy of shutting their eyes and encouraging the aggressive aspirations of Germany, Italy and Japan.

The book makes the conclusion based on real historical facts that the direct and indirect encouragement which the governments of England and France gave the fascist spoilers, the betrayal of the national interests of both their own and other countries, the refusal to create collective security system, their transition to positions of "non-interference" and their intention to direct fascist aggression against the Soviet Union facilitated preparations for and the start of the Second World War. The book also stresses that U.S. ruling circles which posed as a "neutral observer", but which in fact fully supported the English and French policies that fought for collusion with Hitlerite Germany, also bear direct responsibility for this situation.

The policy of "pacification," "non-interference" and "neutrality" which England, France and the US were conducting at that time was countered by the Soviet Union's policy which is convincingly shown in the monograph and by the intense struggle by the USSR and the world's progressive forces to avert war. It was our country that put the task of creating collective and effective security on the agenda and devoted its maximum effort to resolving it. The Soviet Union's policy received warm approval and support from the European Communist Parties. However they still did not have enough power to stave off the threat of war.

The book gives a rather complete picture of how the war began and how the main events chronologically and sequentially took place. The extensive historical material that the authors amassed lets the reader judge the plans of the fascist invaders, their routes toward achieving their assigned goals and the enormous threat which, despite the treaty on non-aggression that was concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany in August 1939, even more so hung over the Motherland. As a matter of fact, the Soviet people understood that this treaty would not save the USSR from the danger of fascist aggression. It was important to put off its start and gain time to prepare to repulse the enemy and also to undermine international imperialism's plans for creating a united anti-Soviet front before the war. And the Country of Soviet was successful in doing this.

The book does a good job in showing how, even with an increasing danger of aggression, the Communist Party did everything possible to free the fraternal people of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia from the threat of fascist slavery and did not allow imperialist powers to establish a beachhead for aggression in the Baltic and Bessarabia. Much was done to strengthen our borders, to include the borders of Finland.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government's development and implementation of a series of measures to further increase the defensive capabilities of the country are very significant. As a tank man, I cannot help but note the fact that in addition to developing and improving various spheres of military industry, serious attention was focused (the book also addresses this) on increasing the capacity of tank building factories and deploying the foundation of the country's tank building to the eastern section of the country.

Considering the situation that had developed, the Communist Party carried out tremendous ideological and indoctrinational work among the population and was concerned with developing a cadre for the Army and Navy, improving the structure of the Armed Forces and developing military art. In short, preparations for the upcoming terrible ordeals were well-grounded and carried out on many levels. But history provided only a little time for these preparations. And nonetheless, the book stresses that everything that the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, did on the eve of the war played an important role in achieving victory over Fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.

It is thought that the creators of this major work acted correctly in allotting the primary place in the book to showing the Soviet people's struggle against the German Fascist invaders. The Great Patriotic War in the defense of socialism and the freedom and independence of our Motherland became the most important integral part of the Second World War and the Soviet-German Front became the war's primary front. The numbers and facts given in the book are convincing testimony to this. Germany and its partners in robbery threw 190 crack divisions against the USSR. The highly mobile and well-armed enemy groups included 5.5 million men, more than 47,000 cannons and mortars, approximately 4300 tanks and assault guns and up to 5000 combat airplanes.

By that time, Fascist Germany had the resources of almost all of Europe that it had occupied. It had the latest equipment and weapons. Germany's personnel and command cadre had important combat experience. The enemy succeeded in creating major force superiority on the axes of the main attacks.

During fierce battles the Red Army was forced to withdraw into the country's heart. In this dire time the Soviet people and Soviet soldiers manifested with all their might their extremely strong spiritual force and their unfailing faith in victory, in our party and in the correctness of our pursuit.

The reader will certainly not remain indifferent to the pages of the book that recount the inspirational and organizational role of the Communist Party and its titanic struggle to turn the country into a united military camp and mobilize its resources and the people's efforts to repulse fascist aggression. From the opening days of the war our party became a fighting party. Millions of Soviet people from all corners of our great multi-national country fervently responded to its fiery call "Everything for the Front! Everything for Victory!"

I remember those days well. I was then serving in the Far East as the chief of staff of a mechanized corps. And immediately after we received notification of the treacherous fascist attack on our Motherland, our headquarters received hundreds of requests addressed to the commander from our subordinates, all requesting transfers to the front, to the army that was fighting, as soon as possible. The soldiers and commanders longed for battle. And I won't hide the fact that I also had this desire. But a little time elapsed before echelons of the 112th Tank Divisions to which I had been assigned as commander moved from the eastern part of the country to its capital, the city of Moscow.

The book uses feats of soldiers from the immortal garrison of the Brest stronghold as well as soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves in battles against the enemy at Peremyshl and Libava (Leipaya) naval base as examples of the courage and determination of the socialist Motherland's defenders. The combat feats and deeds of the participants at the battle of Smolensk which unfolded on the main Moscow axis arouse feelings of pride and admiration. It was in the fire of the battles at Smolensk that the fierce volleys of Leningrad "Katyushas" first gathered force. The Soviet Guards were born there and the enemy attack on Moscow was stalled there.

But in addition to paying tribute to the determination, courage and mass heroism of Soviet patriots, the authors of this book also honestly discuss the Red Army's shortcomings at the beginning of the war and the isolated errors of the Soviet leadership and the military command occurred. And this, the book's fundamental truth, is one of its virtues.

By becoming acquainted with the military-political situation that had developed in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, the reader clearly sees that, despite the fact that by the end of September the enemy was located 300 kilometers from Moscow, at the walls of besieged Leningrad, was threatening the Kharkov industrial area and the Don Basin, and in October had penetrated into the Crimea and was laying siege to Sevastopol, Fascist Germany's plans for a quick rout of the USSR came to naught. The monograph stresses, "more than three months had passed since the war began and yet not a single mission as defined by the 'Barbarossa' plan and not one of the strategic axes had yet been totally completed in the planned timeframe."

The historic battle of Moscow was the decisive event in the first year of the Great Patriotic War. The authors of the work under review have succeeded in recreating the multi-level panorama of one of the greatest battles of the past war. Its stages chronologically unfold before the reader and he sees what the correlation of forces and equipment was for the warring sides, which Soviet military leaders implemented control over the fronts, how our soldiers fought and what results they achieved in the course of the combat operations.

I as well as thousands of other soldiers had occasion to participate in this battle, as I commanded the 112th Tank Division. My memory still retains the names of many heroic tankers who staunchly held the defense and then made the counter-strike against fascist forces at Kashira. And it is impossible to forget the military feats of the division's soldiers during the Soviet counter-offensive in December 1941 when our major formations, operating as part of the 50th Army, made a daring raid at Kaluga, burst into the city and held it until the army's main force came up. The division's tankers who had received their baptism in the battles for the capital later carried their glory-covered banners on the fields of battle with honor, right up to the lair of the fascist brute -- Berlin.

Pilots and artillery men, infantry men and people's home guardsmen, tankers and partisans fought heroically in the battle for Moscow. And those working in the Soviet rear area made a weighty contribution to the overall deed. It would not be an over-exaggeration to say that all our immense country, all the fraternal people that populate it, the millions of Soviet people for which the word Moscow has always been a synonym for the freedom and independence of the Socialist Motherland, directly or indirectly waged this war.

The rout of fascist German forces at Moscow was the decisive political-military event during the first year of the Great Patriotic War, the beginning of its radical change and the first major defeat for the Hitlerites in the Second World War. Soviet Armed Forces debunked the legend about Wehrmacht invincibility before the whole world on those snow-laden fields around Moscow.

The book's fourth and fifth chapters, "A Radical Change in the War" and "The End of the War in Europe", are devoted to the greatest battles of the Second World War such as the battle for Stalingrad, at the Kursk Bulge, on the Dnieper and Pravoberezhnaya Ukraina, in Belorussia, in the Baltic region and beyond the borders of our country. During these battles the Soviet Armed Forces inflicted shattering blows against the German fascist invaders and continued to firmly retain the strategic initiative so that by the end of 1944 they had completely expelled the enemy from our native land and then carried out their great liberating mission with honor, bringing freedom to a Europe that had been enslaved by the Hitlerite fascists.

The reader will find in these chapters a rather complete analysis of the course of the war in other theaters of combat operations and specifically in North Africa, Italy and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The primary operations by the forces of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, not only against the German Wehrmacht, but also against militaristic Japan, were subjected to detailed analysis.

The authors of the book gave an important place to the allies' opening of the Second Front, to the Red Army's liberation of European countries and to an interpretation of the final stage of the Great Patriotic War for our people and for its Armed Forces, the battle for Berlin, and a number of offensive operations that preceded it.

The chapter "The End of the War!" concludes the first part of the book. This chapter examines combat operations that the armed forces of the US and England conducted in the Pacific Ocean and South-East Asia after triumphal weapons volleys had died down in May 1945 and peace had come to Europe. There is a detailed account of the decisive contribution that the USSR made to the rout of militaristic Japan which brought an end to the Second World War and provided a powerful impulse to the development of the revolutionary and national liberation movements by peoples on the Asian Continent.

The second part of the work will attract the reader's attention. In this part the authors illuminate the social and political results of the war. Basing their conclusion on extremely rich factual material, they convincingly show the decisive role that the Soviet Union played in the victory over fascism and Japanese militarism. They also stress that the primary feature of the modern epoch, the invincibility of socialism as a social system, appeared with the victorious end of the war and that it has special, paramount significance.

The victory gained over fascism hastened the objective process of the development of the international communist and workers movement, facilitated the ripening of conditions for popular democratic and socialist revolutions in many countries and as a result of this, socialism went beyond the bounds of a single state. It confirmed the role of the worker class, as guided by the Communist Party, in the battle against fascism and militarism and facilitated the rise of the national-liberation movement in colonial and independent countries.

An undeniable feature of this book is that the authors used specific historical and statistical material to show the vital significance of both the Soviet-German Front in the battle against the fascist aggressors and the USSR's decisive contribution to the rout of the enemy. Here is but example to corroborate this. Fascist German personnel losses on the Soviet-German Front alone were four time greater than in the Western European and Mediterranean Theaters of combat operations. And the basic part of the aggressor's combat equipment, up to 75 percent of his total losses in tanks and assault guns, more than 75 percent of his aviation losses and 74 percent of his losses in artillery weapons, was destroyed here on the Second World War's primary front. And the book has many such facts that strike out at history's falsifiers who are attempting to reduce the Soviet Union's and its Armed Force's role and significance in the rout of the German fascist invaders and their allies.

By giving reactionary bourgeois historiographers a worthy reproof, the authors of the work being reviewed are at the same time also analyzing the real contribution of our allies in the battle against the fascist bloc and are objectively evaluating the results of the USSR's military and political cooperation with the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The CPSU's policy of strengthening the defensive power of the Country of Soviets and guiding the national economy and the Armed Forces is clearly and convincingly revealed in the book. The Leninist Party was a fighting party. Communists went to the most dangerous and critical sectors of the battle against the enemy. The information which the authors present totally confirms this and shows how the party, the agencies of governmental power and control and the social organizations was carried out their reconstruction work during the war. It also shows how much significance was given to preparing military command cadres, improving the activities of political organizations and party and political work in the Army and the Navy, increasing party ranks, increasing the activities of party organizations in providing examples of communists carrying out their party and service responsibilities and mobilizing the Soviet people to rout the invaders.

The organizational and inspirational role of the Communist Party showed up clearly in the pre-war and war years and especially in such important areas as control of the socialist economy. V. I. Lenin noted, "War is a test of the entire economic and organizational power of each nation" (Complete Works, volume 39, page 321). And the Soviet economy withstood this very difficult ordeal with honor, as the data and special tables given in the book prove. This data compares the production of basic types of industrial products in the USSR and in fascist Germany in the 1940-1944 period, gives the Soviet Union's production of the basic types of industrial and agricultural products from 1939 to 1945 and reflects the dynamics of our country's war time economy as well as the production of the most important types of military equipment in the USSR.

A comparison and analysis of the cited data with the data located in the chapter "The Economic Defeat of the States in the Fascist Bloc" will leave the reader no doubt about how great an advantage our economy had in its potential capabilities versus the economies of Fascist Germany and its satellites.

The fourth part of the book entitled "Armed Forces and Military Art" will attract the reader's attention. This section contains a generalized analysis of the characteristic traits of the armed forces of the states that took part in the war and of armed combat as the decisive form of hostility between the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition and the fascist aggressors. The authors have helped the reader to better understand how the Soviet Armed Forces were developed, how their combat power increased and how national liberation armies came into existence in a number of countries and took an active part in the armed struggle during the war against German Fascism and Japanese militarism.

Structural peculiarities of the armed forces from bourgeois states in the anti-Hitler coalition and from the countries of the fascist-militaristic bloc are also objects of the authors' analysis. The monograph focuses a lot of attention on the development of Soviet military art. Its superiority over the military art of Fascist Germany and militaristic Japan was convincingly proven on the battlefields of this past war. It was in this war that the talents of our military leaders who proved themselves to be worthy successors and continuers of the best traditions of the motherland's military art were so widely revealed.

Along with detailed research into the basic trends and scales of the development of Soviet military art, the book's authors show how the military art of our allies and that of the countries in the fascist-militaristic bloc developed and what forms and methods the states that most actively participated in the Second World War used to control armed combat.

The concluding section of the book entitled "Lessons from the War and The Present" presents the basic problems of the post-war period. The authors analyze the social-political and economic changes that took place in our country and in a number of other countries of the world after the war ended. They use specific examples to show the dynamic development in the world's revolutionary process and how capitalism's general crisis is expanding. They also turn their attention to the USSR and the democratic forces' struggle to strengthen the results of the past war and they expose the attempts by falsifiers who try to intentionally twist many Second World War events and its results in bourgeois historiography.

The book ends with the chapter "Preserving Peace and Averting Nuclear War -The Primary Problem of the Present." This chapter stresses that the
generalized experience of the Second World War and the results and lessons
that come out of it are very real for the planet's present and future
generations. The past war and its results give people an understanding of the
danger that wars, and especially world wars, unleashed by imperialism bring
with them and an understanding of the fact that they most be totally
eliminated from society.

The results of the war show that there are no forces in the world able to overwhelm socialism and stop the process of historical development. And attempts to achieve this are doomed to failure. Perhaps one of the chief results of the war is this. And the main lesson of the Second World War is

that we must fight against war even long before it begins and must all struggle together using all the mutual efforts of the peoples of all countries, regardless of their social structure.

History teaches us vigilance. And so that mankind's tragedy is not repeated, so that the flame of a new, and especially a nuclear war does not break out, we must be on the alert, expose the aggressive aspirations of modern imperialism, undermine its hegemonic plans and decisively repulse any intrigues by enemies of peace and international security. This is especially important now, when the United States of America and its partners in the aggressive NATO Bloc are doing everything possible to support reactionary regimes, are stoking the arms race, attempting to militarize space and carry out their so-called "Star Wars" program and are rousing hotbeds of military conflicts and provocation at "flashpoints" in our planet.

And another good point is that the book has a chronicle of the primary events in the past war and the post-war period, is rich with illustrative material and also has an index of names and a list of maps. All of this helps readers to better understand the issues and problems that are illuminated in this work.

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CSO: 1801/162

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

MOSCOW ON ROLE OF U.S. SPECIAL FORCES ON OKINAWA

OW150538 Moscow in Mandarin to China 0700 GMT 13 May 86

[Commentary by Mulatov]

[Text] According to Japan's KYODO NEWS SERVICE, the U.S. special forces stationed on Japan's Okinawa have stepped up their activities. It is learned that these aggressive U.S. forces often conduct exercises in Thailand in order to increase their ability to fight in tropical jungles. In this connection station observer Mulatov writes:

According to KYODO, there are about 20 Green Beret mobile teams stationed on Okinawa. The American training system requires each such mobile team to fight independently in an Asian country. Such fighting acts include surprise attacks, sabotage, large-scale terrorist activities, blocking vital communication lines, and kidnapping. It is learned that the tropical jungles selected for the U.S. special forces exercise sites are characteristic of Southeast Asian countries. This is why the U.S. command has systematically sent special forces from Okinawa to Thailand for military exercises.

The nature and training system of these mobile aggressive forces clearly show the aims of regular U.S. military presence in various parts of Asia, which of course are not to protect American interests or to prevent the fabricated threat of communist expansion.

In massing various types of armed forces on military bases in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and other regions, U.S. imperialism aims at forcing the people of various Asian countries to submit to its domination. The aims of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are the same as those the United States is trying to achieve by massing a large armed force in the Mediterranean. The United States committed aggression against Libya by savagely bombing that country's Tripoli and Benghazi only because the sovereign Arab state of Libya has refused to allow itself to be ordered about by the United States, has pursued an independent policy, and has consistently opposed imperialism and neocolonialism.

The U.S. war machine and its branches in various regions control scores of independent countries and pose a threat to the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Asia and other continents.

Against which countries will the Green Beret forces now undergoing special training in Okinawa, Thailand, and other countries be used? Washington will not let Asian, African, and Latin countries know its punitive expedition plans beforehand, nor will it mention which disobedient countries will be taught a lesson.

Practice shows that a developing country may be subjected to U.S. military interference no matter how far it is from the United States. This is why people everywhere are striving to get rid of U.S. military bases, to stop U.S. military interference in sovereign countries, to protect the safety of people, and to avoid so-called protection by imperialism.

/9604 CSO: 4005/879

BRIEFS

U.S. TO SELL ARMS TO PORTUGAL, NETHERLANDS--Washington, 29 Jul TASS--The U.S. Administration has announced its intention to sell a large consignment of armaments to two of its West European NATO allies--Portugal and the Netherlands. Sixty-six antiaircraft "Chaparral" missiles, 5 launching installations and 2 radar stations to be deployed in forward positions will be delivered to Portugal. Apart from it, Lisbon will receive corresponding equipment and spares for the launching installations and the radar stations. According to Washington's plans, the Dutch Army will receive antitank "TOW-2" guided missiles. According to preliminary information, the value of the deal is estimated at 67 million dollars. /Text//Moscow TASS in English 0829 GMT 29 Jul 86 LD/ 12228

TASS REJECTS BUNDESWEHR HEAD'S 'HARANGUES'--Moscow 8 Jul TASS--Tass analyst Lev Aksenov writes: Speaking in Moenchengladbach, Wolfgang Altenburg, Bundeswehr inspector general, called for creating at the earliest qualitatively new systems of conventional arms for the West Germany Army. If one listens to Altenburg, one will surely have an impression that the Bundeswehr is practically armless. There is a shortage of tanks and scarcity of bombers. So it is necessary to arm and to arm in a hurry. Such additional armament has to be shouldered, naturally, by West German taxpayers: in the near future they have to come down with 842 million marks to purchase 150 Leopard-2 tanks. It will be recalled that, according to the DPA agency, at present the Bundeswehr ground forces have 4,887 tanks. But this is not enough at all for Altenburg. The West German military do not limit their aspirations only to tanks, they also demand purchasing 35 Tornado jets. Altenburg's harangues on the "armless Bundeswehr" are designed for simpletons. However their danger lies in the fact that, by intensifying the arms race, official Bonn is aggravating the situation in the centre of Europe, in the area bristling with the latest systems of weapons, which runs counter to the FRG's national interests and to the interests of preserving peace. /Text/ /Moscow TASS in English 1035 GMT 8 Jul 86 LD/ 12228

AMERICAN SPY PLANE--Pyongyang--According to the Central Telegraph Agency of Korea, an American SR-71 spy plane violated the air space of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic twice on March 17. The agency notes that American reconnaissance flights over KPDR territory became more frequent after the U.S.A. and South Korea began the "Team Spirit 86" large-scale maneuvers on 10 February. [Text] [Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Mar 86 p 3] 13109

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CSO: 1801/190

AFGHANISTAN

KABUL PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON STINGER MISSILES

LD241306 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 24 May 86

[Text] A press conference for local and foreign journalists has been held in Kabul. It has been organized by the BAKHTAR news agency in connection with the supplies of Stinger antiaircraft missiles by the U.S. Administration to the counterrevolutionary bands in Afghanistan. Boris Savodyan, our correspondent, reports from the Afghan capital:

General Mohammad 'Aziz Negahban, minister of civil aviation, who addressed the journalists, stated that the Stinger missiles have already been delivered to the camps of the Afghan counterrevolution in Pakistan. A special group of U.S. advisers is teaching the Afghan cutthroats to operate these lethal weapons. So far there have been no cases of Stingers being used in Afghanistan, but the experience of the 8-year undeclared war indicates that any kind of weapons, including chemical weapons which are obtained by the bandits from their transatlantic patrons, are used against our people. Mohammad 'Aziz Negahban talked about many cases of attacks on Afghan civilian aircraft by CIA hirelings.

Among the participants of the press conference was Mohammad Akbar, chief pilot of the Bakhtar Afghan (al-vatana) company. Two and one half years ago, the (BS-4) civilian airliner, which he piloted and on board of which were 295 people, was fired at by a U.S. ground-air missile. Only thanks to the skill of the crew did they succeed in avoiding a catastrophe and land the aircraft at Kabul airport.

The fact that the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles are in the possession of Dushmans considerably increases the danger to civilian airliner flights Mohammad Adbar said. Hundreds of [words indistinct] people may die; and not only my compatriots. After all, transit routes of many Western aviation companies pass through Afghan air-space. The Stingers, which were handed to Dushmans, may also be used against their aircraft. On behalf of all pilots of the country's civil aviation, I condemn the action of the U.S. Administration. By supplying the latest weapons to the counterrevolutionaries, Washington had yet again proved that it intends to take a path of further escalation of the undeclared war against Afghanistan, Mohammad Akbar, a pilot of the Bakhtar Afghan (al-vatana) company said in conclusion.

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CSO: 1812/211

AFGHANISTAN

USSR-DRA FILM ON LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN RELEASED

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 14 Mar 86, p 4

[UzTAG report: "Film Chronicle of Afghanistan"]

[Text] "Afghanistan, Fall 85" is the name of a new Soviet-Afghan film, a work completed in the Uzbekistan Film Studio of Scientific-Popular and Documentary Films.

Fall is only a reference point for the changes which have occurred in the country since the day of the April Revolution. The film's authors, director Kh. Dzhurayev and cameramen T. Nadyrov and G. Shukurov, showed the creative life of the Afghan people and their struggle for freedom and national independence.

"We saw how enemies of the revolution try to prevent the Afghans from building a new life," says cameraman Gayrat Shukurov. "In the film we decided to convey the complex situation which has developed in the country thorugh the fault of international counterrevolution.

Gutted kishlaks, destroyed crops, demolished schools and hospitals, these frames filmed in the south of the republic by our Afghan colleagues once again confirm that the immediate culprit in the undeclared war against the DRA is Imperialism headed by the U.S.A. Former ringleaders of dushman bands related how instructors from the U.S.A. trained them. The weapons captured from the bandits is of American manufacture.

A gathering at the American Embassy to which over 200,000 Afghans went with a demand to cease U.S. interference in the republic's internal affairs created a great impression on the film crew.

The republic's peaceful life--social transformations and the formation of the national economy--were amply reflected in the film. The audience will see the major industrial complex which was created in the republic's north with the help of the Soviet Union: the gasworks in Shibirgan and the nitric fertilizer plant in Mazarisharif.

The principal actors in the film are the Afghan people who are defending the accomplishment of the April Revolution. The film's authors heard many words of gratitude from them toward the Soviet Union. The new film is part of a film chronicle of Afghanistan which the Uzbek cinematrographers are conducting. It already includes the documentary films "Afghanistan: the Revolution Continues," "Who Is Firing at the Republic," "The Anniversary of the April Revolution" and others.

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AFGHANISTAN

EXPLOITS, EXAMPLE OF COMMUNISTS IN DRA REPORTED

[Editorial Report] PM241827 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 June 1986 second edition carries on page 3 a 2,400-word article by Major V. Svetikov under the heading "The People in the Front Ranks," describing acts of courage by communists serving in the DRA and the example they set to others. "The tens and hundreds of officers and men who have joined the party ranks in Afghanistan," Svetikov notes, "prove by their actions that, as a rule, mistakes are rarely made in admitting new members to the CPSU there." Svetikov cites several examples of fearlessness shown by communists in action to highlight this point, including dangerous "mine detecting operations" -- some of the mines being "of British manufacture." One mine clearing vehicle was blown up, Svetikov reports, when a Soviet Army subunit was "clearing the way for an Afghan unit in Paktia Province." "The majority of heroes of the Soviet Union who have been awarded this high title for the fulfillment of their international duty in Afghanistan are communists," he observes. "The combat ability of a subunit or unit," he concludes, "is frequently determined not by the number of weapons but by the number of communists."

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CSO: 1801/220

BRIEFS

AFGHAN FAMILIES RETURN TO DRA--Kabul, 22 Jul (TASS)--TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin reports: Recently 600 Afghan families who, having fallen for the deceitful propaganda of the enemies of the April Revolution, had left for Iran some time ago have returned to the district of Khuzestan in Herat Province. "Having found ourselves in a foreign land, we immediately understood the mistake we had made by leaving our villages," declared Delawar, an elder of the returned families. "We became paupers in Iran. We had to sell the clothes we wore for a piece of bread, and our children were dying from starvation and diseases. The authorities even forbade us from burying our dead in the cemetery." The Afghans, led to extreme poverty and desperation, broke through Iranian armed covering [as received] forces and returned to their homes. The revolutionary authorities assisted them by providing accommodation and food. Many of those that returned have taken up arms to repulse counterrevolutionary bands. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0829 GMT 22 Jul 86] /9604

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